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ISRAEL’S CONFLICTED EXISTENCE AS 
A JEWISH DEMOCRATIC STATE: 
STRIKING THE PROPER BALANCE 
UNDER THE CITIZENSHIP AND ENTRY 
INTO ISRAEL LAW 
I. INTRODUCTION  
tates once had unfettered discretion over whom may be-
come their citizens.  That discretion was thought to be 
unfettered because it was regarded as an element of sover-
eignty.  Indeed, it was not uncommon for States to exercise it 
even by excluding foreigners on the basis of race, color, or na-
tional origin.  
The past fifty years have changed all that.  International law 
now limits a State’s discretion over matters of citizenship.  The 
growth and recognition of democracy and human rights since 
World War II obligates States to guarantee equal, fundamental 
rights to citizens and non-citizens alike, without distinction on 
the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin.  Hence, 
democratic1 States have not typically been founded or predi-
cated upon maintaining a certain racial or religious character; 
to do so externally by denying entry into the State on grounds of 
race or ethnicity is no more legitimate than implementing an 
internal system of systematic racial discrimination such as 
apartheid.  
Israel, thus occupies an anomalous position among democ-
ratic states.  On May 15, 1948, the State of Israel was founded 
on two fundamental yet irreconcilable principles.  It was estab-
lished as a Jewish State which, as held by Israel’s highest court, 
embodied “three tenets: 1) the right of return, i.e., the right of 
every Jew to immigrate to Israel; 2) the maintenance of a Jew-
ish majority in the State, and 3) a connection between the Dias-
  
 1. The term “democracy” is defined as a “[g]overnment by the people, 
exercised either directly or through elected representatives” and “the princi-
ples of social equality and respect for the individual within the community.”  
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 380 (2d College ed. 1982).   
S 
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pora and the State of Israel.”2  Yet, Israel was also founded as a 
democratic State which aimed to ensure “complete equality of 
social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of 
religion, race or sex.”3  This paradoxical combination of com-
mitments to a racial and religious character and to democracy 
and human rights initially went unquestioned, in part, because 
of the resurgence of the Zionist movement after the Nazi holo-
caust, and, in part, because of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Israel 
has thus, for its relatively brief existence, tried to pursue these 
irreconcilable goals. 
The recent enactment of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel 
Law, 5763-2003 was Israel’s attempt to balance the Jewish 
character of Israel against the democratic principles upon 
which it was founded.  The law denies Palestinians in the Oc-
cupied Territories Israeli citizenship and residency.  It also pro-
hibits Palestinian spouses of Israeli citizens from obtaining Is-
raeli citizenship or residency, thus separating inter-racially 
married couples or those contemplating marriage.  In addition 
to stopping “terrorism,” the purpose of the law is to preserve the 
Jewish majority in Israel by preventing the influx of Palestini-
ans from the Occupied Territories.  It therefore seeks to serve 
one of Israel’s defining principles while contradicting the other.  
This Note will argue that the Citizenship and Entry into Israel 
Law represents Israel’s inability to exist as a Jewish democratic 
State in conformance with its human rights obligations.  
Part II of this Note will survey several Israeli citizenship 
laws which constitute Israel’s citizenship policy.  Part III will 
recount the evolution of Israel’s citizenship policy and its effects 
upon Palestinians residing in the Occupied Territories.  Part IV 
  
 2. See David Kretzmer, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW 
OF ISRAEL 39, 42 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995) (citing 
Ben Shalom v. Central Elections Committee for the Twelfth Knesset, 43(4) 
P.D. 221, 248 (1989)).  It is often argued that “Israel is Jewish only in the 
sense that England is English, so that those who (vainly) insist on the facts 
are uniquely rejecting the rights of Jewish nationalism….” NOAM CHOMSKY, 
FATEFUL TRIANGLE: THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL, & THE PALESTINIANS 157 (Up-
dated ed., 1999) [hereinafter CHOMSKY, FATEFUL TRIANGLE].  However, this 
argument is flawed, since a “citizen of England is English, but a citizen of 
Israel may not be Jewish,” a situation described by Professor Chomsky as “a 
non-trivial fact, much obscured in deceptive rhetoric.”  Id. (footnote omitted).    
 3. The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 
1 L.S.I. 3 (1948).  
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will examine the level of discretion accorded to the State in de-
vising its own citizenship policy and the possible limitations 
placed upon the State by international law.  Part V will analyze 
the legality of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law under 
international human rights law and Part VI will conclude the 
Note with some possible solutions that may be implemented to 
bring Israel into conformance with its international legal obli-
gations.   
II. THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL: THE LAW OF RETURN AND THE 
NATIONALITY LAW 
Israel’s citizenship policy is based on two pieces of legislation, 
the Law of Return, 5710-1950 and the Nationality Law, 5712-
1952.4  In a statement by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to 
the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, before the passage of the two 
laws, he stated that: 
The Law of Return and the Nationality Law which are before 
you are closely connected and have a common ideological ba-
sis, that derives from the historical uniqueness of the State of 
Israel, a uniqueness that relates to the past and the future…. 
These two laws determine the special character and purpose of 
the State of Israel which carries the message of the redemp-
tion of Israel….5 
A.   The Law of Return 
The Law of Return grants “every Jew … the right to come to 
[Israel] as an oleh.”6  The status of an oleh is granted to any Jew 
  
 4. Law of Return, 5710-1950, 1 L.S.I. 114 (1949-1950); Nationality Law, 
5712-1952, 6 L.S.I. 50 (1951-1952).  
 5. DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 31 n.3 
(1990) (quoting D.K. (1950) 2036-37).  The “historical uniqueness” Prime Min-
ister Ben-Gurion speech was not discovered until 1942, the year in which the 
Zionist movement was “officially committed to the establishment of a Jewish 
State.”  CHOMSKY, FATEFUL TRIANGLE, supra note 2, at 160.  Indeed, prior to 
that time, “Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and others declared that they would 
never agree to a Jewish state, ‘which would eventually mean Jewish domina-
tion of Arabs in Palestine.’”  Id. (quoting NOAM CHOMSKY, TOWARDS A NEW 
COLD WAR 439 (1982)).  These concerns, however, were “reduced to a minority” 
in the midst of World War II and the Nazi holocaust.  Id.   
 6. Law of Return § 1, 5710-1950, 1 L.S.I. 114.  “Oleh” as defined in the 
Law of Return “means a Jew immigrating, into Israel.”  Id. While the defini-
tion of an oleh does not make a direct reference to a right of citizenship, it will 
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who immigrated to Israel prior to 1950 and any Jew who was 
born in Israel, before or after 1950.7  A 1970 amendment to the 
Law of Return liberalized the immigration policy in Israel by 
conferring the rights of an oleh to “a child and a grandchild of a 
Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and the 
spouse of a grandchild of a Jew.”8  However, in keeping with the 
founding principles of Israel as a Jewish state, “a person who 
has been a Jew and has voluntarily changed his religion” is dis-
allowed from obtaining citizenship in Israel.9  The Law of Re-
turn is often viewed “as a fundamental principle of the State of 
Israel, possibly even its very raison d’etre as a Jewish state.”10 
  
be seen below that attaining the status of an oleh greatly enhances, if not 
conclusively establishes the ability of an individual to become an Israeli citi-
zen under the closely related Nationality Law. See infra text accompanying 
note 13. 
 7. Law of Return § 4, 5710-1950, 1 L.S.I. 114. 
 8. Law of Return (Amendment No. 2) § 1, 5730-1970, 24 L.S.I. 28 (1969-
1970) (amending Law of Return, 5710-1950, 1 L.S.I. 114 (1949-1950)).  Since 
1995, the Ministry of Interior has narrowly interpreted section 4(A) in its 
application to non-Jewish spouses of Israeli nationals: 
Under the new interpretation, the Law of Return will not … apply to 
the Non-Jewish spouse of a person who already is an Israeli national, 
so that he or she will no longer receive the benefits of a Jewish new 
immigrant, including the right to automatically acquire Israeli citi-
zenship.   
Thus, the Ministry of Interior no longer favors Jewish Israeli nation-
als by automatically granting a citizenship to their foreign national 
spouses.  At present, the foreign spouses of persons who are already 
Israeli national, whether Jewish or Non-Jewish may attain Israeli 
nationality by way of naturalization.   
Second Periodic Report of Israel under article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Hum. 
Rts. Comm., 66th Sess., ¶17, at 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (2001), 
available at http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF?OpenDatabase [hereinafter 
2001 Israel ICCPR Report].  It is notable that the 1970 Amendment to the 
Law of Return introduced, for the first time, a statutory definition of the term 
“Jew” as “a person who was born of a Jewish mother or has become converted 
to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion.”  Id.  
 9. Id. (emphasis added). 
 10. See KRETZMER, supra note 5, at 36.  Several other fundamental Israeli 
laws such as the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-
1948, and the World Zionist Organisation – Jewish Agency (Status) Law, 
5713-1952, also reaffirm the principle that Israel is a state created for the 
Jewish people where “[t]he commitment to Jewish immigration [is] the func-
tion of [Israel].”  See id. at 32, n.7, 45 n.5; see also ARIEL BIN-NUN, THE LAW OF 
THE STATE OF ISRAEL 56 (1990) (stating that “[t]he unconditional conferral 
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B.   The Nationality Law 
The Nationality Law11 passed two years after the Law of Re-
turn, expands on the requirements for obtaining citizenship in 
Israel for Jews and non-Jews.12  In particular, section 2 of the 
Nationality Law automatically grants an oleh, as deemed under 
the Law of Return, the right to Israeli citizenship by return.13  
However, non-Jews generally cannot acquire citizenship by re-
turn and can only do so by residence, birth or naturalization.14  
  
upon every Jew, everywhere, of the right to immigrate is a peculiarity of the 
Israeli Constitution and virtually unparalleled in other rule-of-law states… 
The Zionist idea of the State and the special circumstances of its establish-
ment prompted the lawmaker to promulgate [the Nationality Law].”).   
 11. The meanings of both “nationality” and “citizenship” have been distin-
guished among commentators.  See BIN-NUN, supra note 10, at 40 n.15 (dis-
tinguishing “citizenship” from “nationality” in which the former refers to the 
status of “Israeli” while the latter refers to a “Jew[ ], Arab, Druze, Samarian, 
etc.”); ARYEH GREENFIELD, ENTRY, RESIDENCE, AND CITIZENSHIP 2 (1996) (dis-
tinguishing “nationality” as carrying an “ethnic rather than legal connotation” 
which is more accurately reflected by the terms “citizenship”); Norman 
Bentwich, Nationality in Mandated Territories Detached From Turkey, 7 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 97, 102 (1926) (HeinOnline, Brooklyn Law School Library) (differ-
entiating between “citizenship” which describes one’s “allegiance to the state” 
and “nationality” which is “a matter of race and religion”).  For the purposes of 
this Note the terms “nationality” and “citizenship” will be used interchangea-
bly, defined as “[a person’s] quality of being a subject of a certain state and 
therefore its citizen.”  P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers B.V., 
1979) (1956) [hereinafter WEIS, STATELESSNESS] (quoting L.V. OPPENHEIM, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 642–43 (8th ed. 1955)).  The primary purpose of using the 
two terms interchangeably is to adhere to the differing official English trans-
lations of the same terms provided by the Israeli Government.  For example, 
the Nationality Law as translated officially in the Laws of the State of Israel 
(L.S.I.) is called the “Nationality Law” while the Knesset has recently referred 
to the same law as the “Citizenship Law.”  See Citizenship and Entry into 
Israel Law (temporary provision) § 1, 5763-2003, at http://www.knesset.gov.il/ 
laws/special/eng/citizenship_law.htm (unofficial translation) (last visited Apr. 
11, 2004). 
 12. See generally Nationality Law, 5712-1952, 6 L.S.I. 50.    
 13. See id. § 2; see also KRETZMER, supra note 5, at 36.    
 14. See Nationality Law §§ 3–5, 5712-1952, 6 L.S.I., at 51.  Sections 3 and 
5, which govern the conferral of citizenship vis-à-vis residence and naturaliza-
tion respectively, contain various criteria that must all be met before a non-
Jew is allowed to obtain Israeli citizenship.  Id.  This is a marked difference 
from the ability of Jews to automatically obtain citizenship by way of return 
without having to satisfy any such conditions.  Id. § 2.  See also KRETZMER, 
supra note 5, at 36.  The discriminatory treatment between Jews and non-
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While acquiring citizenship by naturalization is difficult due to 
the requisite criteria, which must all be met in addition to its 
discretionary nature, the Nationality Law provides an alterna-
tive avenue for non-Jewish spouses to obtain citizenship in Is-
rael as a means of facilitating family unification.  Section 7 of 
the Nationality Law allows for a “spouse of a person who is an 
Israel national…[to] obtain Israel nationality by naturalization  
…even if he does not meet the requirements [otherwise required 
for obtaining Israeli citizenship by naturalization].”15   
The legislation governing Israeli citizenship policy, namely 
the Law of Return and the Nationality Law, overtly discrimi-
nates16 between Jews and non-Jews.17  However, a non-Jew, 
  
Jews in granting a right of return to Jews has been alleviated somewhat by 
section 4 of the Nationality Law in which non-Jews as well as Jews born in or 
out of Israel to a parent who is an Israeli citizen may obtain citizenship by 
birth.   See Nationality (Amendment No. 2) Law § 4(A), 5728-1968, 22 L.S.I. 
241, 242 (1967-1968) (amending Nationality Law §4, 5712-1952, 6 L.S.I. 50 
(1951-1952)).  Thus, as Kretzmer rightly concludes, “there is no discrimination 
in the method of acquiring citizenship for Jews and non-Jews born to parents 
one of whom is a citizen,” and “the real ‘citizenship beneficiaries’ of section 
4(a)(1) regarding citizenship by birth are Arabs born to parents one of whom 
is an Israeli citizen.”  KRETZMER, supra note 5, at 39.  However, for a Jew born 
in Israel, the right of return as a means of attaining Israeli citizenship still 
remains if obtaining citizenship by birth is not a viable alternative. Id.   
 15. See Nationality Law § 7, 6 L.S.I., at 52 (emphasis added).  The natu-
ralization process under section 5 of the Nationality Law requires compliance 
with the following six conditions before Israel citizenship is granted: 
(1) he is in Israel; 
(2) he has been in Israel for three out of the five years that preceded 
the submission of his application; 
(3) he is entitled to reside in Israel permanently; 
(4) he has settled or intends to settle in Israel; 
(5) he has some knowledge of the Hebrew language; 
(6) he renounced his prior citizenship or proved that he will cease to 
be a foreign citizen when he becomes an Israel citizen.   
Id. §§ 5(a)(1)-(6).   
 16. The characterization of the Nationality Law and the Law of Return as 
overtly discriminating between Jews and non-Jews is not meant to denote a 
sense of illegality in the present context but rather to describe a legally sig-
nificant distinction premised upon Israel’s foundation as a Jewish state.  See 
W. A. McKean, The Meaning of Discrimination in International and Munici-
pal Law, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 177, 177–78 (1970) (distinguishing between 
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while subject to more restrictive conditions than those applied 
to a Jewish immigrant, is still afforded access to the legal 
means of attaining Israeli citizenship.18  Whether, as a practical 
matter, Israeli authorities actually confer citizenship on non-
Jews, particularly Palestinians born or residing in the West 
Bank and Gaza, is not clear since the majority of these Pales-
tinians must be naturalized and the Interior Minister has dis-
cretionary authority in granting citizenship to naturalized indi-
viduals.19  While the means by which one obtains citizenship in 
Israel, i.e., return, residence, birth, or naturalization, has no 
  
the several meanings attached to “discrimination.”  One being a neutral term 
meaning “distinction” or “differentiation” and the other being more restrictive 
term denoting “an unfair, improper, unjustifiable or arbitrary distinction,” the 
definition which is commonly employed in the international law context.).  
 17. See KRETZMER, supra note 5, at 36 (“The right given in the Law of Re-
turn to Jews to immigrate to Israel is one of the only cases in which an overt 
distinction is made between the rights of Jews and non-Jews.”) (emphasis 
added), 89 (“[The Law of Return and the Nationality Law] are the only in-
stances of legislation that expressly uses the criterion of ‘Jew’ as a condition 
for a right or privilege.”); see also sources cited supra note 10.  From a domes-
tic perspective, the constitutional principle of equality may be infringed by the 
will of the Knesset without adverse legal consequences, as Israel adheres to 
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy:  
As the Israeli parliament and embodiment of its sovereignty, the 
Knesset is supreme over the other branches of the State.  On the leg-
islative level, this supremacy means that the will of the Knesset, un-
der the cloak of law, obligates all other authorities of the State.  It 
also indicates that the source of power of the other branches stems, 
directly or indirectly, from the Knesset. 
Allen Zysblat, The System of Government, in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 1, 6 (Itz-
hak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996).  See also KRETZMER, supra note 5, at 
89.  An official state of emergency also provides the Knesset and Government 
with substantial authority in enacting restrictive measures.  See text accom-
panying infra note 164.   
 18. See KRETZMER, supra note 5, at 40 (noting that “today the law grants 
the right of citizenship to virtually all Arab residents of [Israel].”) (emphasis 
added). 
 19. See Nationality Law § 5(b), 5712-1952, 6 L.S.I., at 52 (“Where a person 
has applied for naturalisation, and he meets the requirements of [naturalisa-
tion in subsection (a)], the Minster of the Interior, if he thinks fit to do so, 
shall grant him Israel nationality….”) (emphasis added).  See also Ammon 
Rubinstein, Citizenship, in ISRAELI BUSINESS LAW: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE 275, 
281 (Alon Kaplan & Paul Ogden eds., 1996) (“The number of cases in which 
the Minister [of Interior] is prepared to grant citizenship through naturaliza-
tion is very small and it is only in exceptional cases that the request is 
granted.”). 
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bearing on the rights which may be exercised such as the right 
to vote or seek employment in civil service,20 several fundamen-
tal Israeli laws only confer certain benefits upon Jews who ob-
tain Israeli citizenship automatically by virtue of their status as 
an oleh.21   
This unique citizenship policy reflects Israel’s commitment in 
establishing a State for the Jewish people.  It is evident, how-
ever, that as of result of this commitment, Israel’s foundation of 
democracy, guaranteeing equal, fundamental rights to citizens 
and non-citizens, has begun to erode.  And as the non-Jewish 
population continues to grow, externally (immigration) or inter-
nally (birth), Israel will need to adopt increasingly restrictive 
measures to preserve its Jewish identity, bringing into question 
the viability of Israel as a democratic state. 
III.   EVOLUTION OF ISRAEL’S CITIZENSHIP POLICY 
On July 31, 2003 the Knesset passed the Citizenship and En-
try into Israel Law, 5763-200322 which severely restricted the 
ability of Palestinians to obtain citizenship or residence in Is-
rael.23  The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law codified the 
  
 20. See Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 283–86; see also BIN-NUN, supra note 
10, at 41 (“The right to vote for and be elected to the Knesset, and employ-
ment in the civil service, are reserved to citizens.”). 
 21. See generally Basic Law: Israel Lands, 5720-1960, 14 L.S.I. 48 (1960) 
and World Zionist Organisation – Jewish Agency (Status) Law, 5713-1952, 7 
L.S.I. 3 (1952-1953).  Kretzmer also reports of other instances of de facto as 
well as de jure discriminatory policies in which rights or benefits are conferred 
depending on whether an individual is Jewish or non-Jewish, the former being 
the beneficiaries of rights solely because of their religious faith.  See generally 
KRETZMER, supra note 5, at 89–134; see also CHOMSKY, FATEFUL TRIANGLE, 
supra note 2, at 157–60.    
 22. See Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision) § 1, 
5763-2003, at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/citizenship_law.htm 
(unofficial translation) (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).    
 23. While much of the discussion on the beneficiaries of Israel’s citizenship 
policy has focused on the dichotomy between Jews and non-Jews, the Citizen-
ship and Entry into Israel Law establishes an additional classification scheme 
by delineating certain “areas,” collectively known as the Occupied Territories 
(Gaza and the West Bank), in which inhabitants thereof are prohibited from 
citizenship or residency in Israel.  See infra text accompanying note 67.   
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restrictive immigration policy which had been implemented in 
Government Decision 1813 in May 2002.24 
A.   The Beginnings of the Freeze on Family Unification 
 Requests and Its Justifications 
The change in Israel’s immigration and citizenship policy im-
plemented by Minister of the Interior, Eli Yishai since May 
2002, effectively “[froze] all family unification requests involv-
ing Palestinians….”25 The freeze created two classifications of 
  
 24. See Draft Bill of Proposed Nationality and Entry into Israel (Tempo-
rary Order) Law, Jun. 4, 2003, Reshumot (2003), available at 
http://www.adalah.org/eng/features/famuni/2003family_uni_prop_bill_rev.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2004) (explaining that the proposed bill is enacted “in 
accordance with Government Decision 1813, of 12 May 2002” to limit the 
granting of residents of designated areas citizenship in Israel).  The Govern-
ment, which may be characterized as the executive branch in Israel’s govern-
mental system, is authorized to enact “subsidiary legislation.”  See Asher 
Maoz, The Institutional Organization of the Israeli Legal System, in 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL, supra note 2, at 11, 22–23.  The Gov-
ernment’s authority to promulgate legislation stems from Israel’s relatively 
liberal adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers.  See id. at 23 (“[T]he 
most serious deviation from the doctrine of separation of powers concerns the 
authority that is vested in the ministers to promulgate emergency regulations, 
which may alter, suspend, or modify any law of the Knesset.”).  The overriding 
oversight mechanism is the principle of legality which is an “extension of the 
rule of law” where “the Government must base its actions on a law authoriz-
ing it to act, or its activities will not have the force of law.”  Zysblat, supra 
note 17, at 8.   
 25. Haim Shapiro, Yishai Freezes Arab Naturalization Requests, 
JERUSALEM POST, May 13, 2002, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Jpost 
File; see also Peter Beaumont, Israel Fears Wave of Immigrants, THE 
OBSERVER, June 16, 2002, at 19, available at LEXIS, News Library, Obsrvr 
File; Matthew Kalman, Why Isn’t My Baba at Home?, TIMES (London), Sept. 2, 
2002, at 8, available at LEXIS, News Library, Ttimes File; Davan Maharaj, 
Israeli Ruling Puts a Freeze on Family Ties; Mideast: The Decision, Called 
Racist By Some, Keeps Palestinians from Israeli Arab Spouses, L.A. TIMES, 
May 24, 2002, at 3, available at LEXIS, News Library, Lat File.  It should be 
noted that the Government has, for some time prior to its May 2002 decision, 
been denying a substantial number of Palestinian applications seeking resi-
dency permits for family reunification purposes.  See Glenn Frankel, Israel 
Assailed for Family Separation; Palestinians Barred From Joining Relatives 
in Occupied Areas, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1987, at A25, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, Wpost File; Israeli Visa Policy on Arabs Keeps Families Apart, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1987, at A11, available at LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File 
(“In recent years, Israeli military officials said only hundreds out of thousands 
of applications [for family reunification] submitted annually had been ap-
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Israelis married to non-Israelis adversely affected by the gov-
ernment’s policy.26  The first group consisted of “non-Israelis 
(mainly Palestinians) who have received a permit to live in Is-
rael and [were] in the midst of a two-phase naturalization proc-
ess lasting four-and-a-half years.”27  As a result of the freeze, 
applications currently pending in the naturalization process 
would be frozen, but the applicants would not be forced to leave 
Israel.28  The second group consisted of “non-Israelis who have 
married Israelis but had not applied for family unification be-
fore the” May 2002 freeze of applications.29  Those constituting 
the second group were barred from applying for family unifica-
tion and were considered illegal residents who had to leave Is-
rael regardless of the whereabouts of their families.30   
In justifying the restrictive measure Israel claimed that 
“some 100,000 Palestinians have fraudulently received [Israeli] 
citizenship, and tens of thousands of others have attempted to 
do so.”31  Particularly, the freeze was allegedly aimed at pre-
  
proved.”); Doug Struck, Israeli Shift Breaks Up Families; Non-Jewish Spouses 
Told To Leave And Apply For Immigration, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1998, at A16, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File.  The systematic expulsion of 
Palestinians from the Occupied Territories, resulting in the separation of 
families, is also a long-standing practice.  See, e.g., Jackson Diehl, Israeli Offi-
cials Announce Easing of Rule for Residing in Territories; Policy of Expelling 
Spouses, Children Had Drawn Criticism, WASH. POST, June, 7, 1990, at A30, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File; Jackson Diehl, Israel Said To 
Be Expelling Palestinians; About 20 Women Ordered To Leave Occupied Land, 
Groups Report, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1991, at A37, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, Wpost; Jackson Diehl, ‘Non-Resident’ Palestinians Forced Out; Rights 
Groups Assail Deportation As Being Politically Motivated, WASH. POST, Jan. 
30, 1990, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File.   
 26. David Izenberg, Court Hears Petitions Against Palestinian Naturaliza-
tion Freeze, JERUSALEM POST, July 18, 2003, at 6A, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, Jpost File.  
 27. Id.  For an in-depth look at this four-year process, see Brief for Peti-
tioner para. 40, at 13–14, Adalah v. Minister of Interior, High Court of Justice 
(H.C. 7052/03). 
 28. Izenberg, supra note 26.   
 29. Id.   
 30. Id.   
 31. Shapiro, supra note 25 (statement by Herzl Gedj, Director of the Inte-
rior Ministry’s Population Registry); see also Izenberg, supra note 26 (accord-
ing to a Ministry of Justice attorney “after the signing of the [Oslo Accords in 
1993], when Israel began to impose regular closures on the disputed territo-
ries and import foreign workers, Palestinians began to value citizenship, 
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venting a situation in which “a Palestinian marries an Israeli, 
brings in children from a previous marriage, then fictitiously 
divorces the Israeli and brings in another Palestinian spouse.”32  
In addition, the Interior Minister justified the decision by citing 
to 1) demographic, 2) security, and 3) economic concerns.33   
1.  The Demographic Justification: Maintaining a  
Jewish Majority 
There is a growing concern in Israel that its Jewish majority 
may become a Jewish minority within thirty years.34  This con-
cern is compounded by claims of “a right of return” to areas of 
Israel from which Palestinians were displaced during the Arab-
Israeli conflict in 1948 and 1967.35  Israel has consistently re-
jected such claims.36  It is feared that “allowing a ‘right of re-
turn’ for Arabs would amount to the suicidal destruction of Is-
rael.”37  Minister of the Interior Yishai confirmed the demo-
graphic concerns of the Israeli community, stating that it may 
be a “deliberate policy on the part of [Yasser Arafat’s] Palestin-
ian Authority, to change in a sophisticated way the demo-
graphic structure of Israel” by “[realizing] ‘the right of return’ 
through the back door [of family unification].”38   
  
which allowed them to receive [various benefits],” thus resulting in many 
sham marriages between Israelis and Palestinians since 1993).   
 32. Shapiro, supra note 25.   
 33. See id. (statement by Interior Minister Eli Yishai) (“The [freeze] is 
motivated by demography, security, and economics in equal measure,” in ad-
dition to the corresponding concerns of “the increasing number of Palestinians 
becoming Israelis, that this population could become a base for terrorism, and 
about the increasing cost of payments to Palestinian families.”).   
 34. See Beaumont, supra note 25.   
 35. See John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return, 39 
HARV. INT’L L. J. 171, 173 (1998) (“Palestinians were displaced from their 
home areas at various times beginning in 1948, with two major episodes of 
hostilities marking the greatest periods of Palestinian flight in 1948 and 
1967.”) [hereinafter Quigley, Right of Return]. 
 36. See id. at 184–93 (describing Israel’s justifications for its non-
conformance with the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 which explicitly 
recognized “ ‘that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at 
peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest prac-
ticable date….’ ”) (quoting G.A. Res. 194, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1,  ¶ 11, at 
24, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)). 
 37. See Maharaj, supra note 25.   
 38. Id. 
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The potential displacement of Israel’s Jewish majority has 
been viewed, from a legal perspective, as a security threat to 
the State.39  Classified as such, Israel would have greater flexi-
bility in complying with its international legal obligations, lim-
iting the exercise of human rights to preserve national secu-
rity.40  However, a national security justification based primar-
ily on demographic concerns necessarily contravenes principles 
of non-discrimination – a non-derogable obligation in interna-
tional human rights law.41  Moreover, international humanitar-
ian law requires that any policies directed at areas under mili-
tary occupation be enacted for purposes of terminating such 
occupation rather than prolonging it.42  Thus, Israel’s demo-
graphic justification for its “freeze” is contrary to international 
law.   
2.   The Security Justification: Saving the Lives of Israelis 
On March 31, 2002, a suicide bomber attacked a restaurant 
in Haifa, resulting in fifteen deaths.43  It was later discovered 
that the suicide bomber had been granted an Israeli residence 
permit because his mother was married to an Israeli national.44  
  
 39. Quigley, Right of Return, supra note 35, at 200 n.163 (quoting Kurt 
René Radley, The Palestinian Refugees: The Right to Return in International 
Law, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 586, 613 (1978)) (“[I]t can fairly be stated that the re-
turn of potentially some one and one-half million Palestinians of doubtful 
allegiance to a state whose population itself numbers only somewhat more 
than three million is as valid a threat to that state’s ‘general welfare’ as there 
is likely to exist.”). 
 40. See id. (citing as an example, Article 29 of the Universal Declaration 
which provides a State with authority to limit the applications of certain hu-
man rights provisions to meet the needs of national welfare).   
 41. See text accompanying infra notes 168–71.  
 42. See text accompanying infra notes 54–55.    
 43. See Beaumont, supra note 25. 
 44. See Maharaj, supra note 25; Beaumont, supra note 25.  Non-citizens 
can legally enter and/or reside in Israel under a visa or residence permit, is-
sued by the Minister of Interior under the Entry into Israel Law.  Entry into 
Israel Law, § 1(b), 5712-1952, 6 L.S.I. 159 (1951-52) (“The residence in Israel 
of a person other than an Israel citizen and other than the holder of an oleh 
visa or oleh certificate shall be by residence permit under [the Entry into Is-
rael Law].”).  However, in issuing visas and residence permits under the Entry 
into Israel Law, the Minister of the Interior is granted wide discretion to es-
tablish: 
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This incident prompted the Interior Ministry to stop consider-
ing Palestinian requests for residence permits,45 thus preventing 
the infiltration of prospective suicide bombers into Israel.46   
In a larger context, Israel has often invoked national security 
as a justification for its “legally dubious policies.”47  It is beyond 
dispute that Israel has a legitimate concern for the security of 
its inhabitants as well as its very existence as a state.48  How-
ever, it is equally clear that any restrictive practices taken 
against the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza 
must conform to the mandates of international humanitarian 
law, namely the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conven-
tions, which require any such measures be necessary and pro-
portional to the provoking actions.49  Moreover, “interference 
with legally protected rights imposes a heavy burden upon an 
occupying power to connect its use of force and other suppres-
sive policies with the requirements of occupation per se.”50    
  
(1) categories of persons who are disqualified from receiving visas or 
residence permits…; 
(2) conditions to be met before a visa is granted, or before a residence 
permit is granted, extended or substituted…; 
[…] 
(4) fees for granting different categories of visas and permits…; 
[…] 
Id. §§ 14(1)-(2) & (4).   The discretion accorded the Minister of the Interior 
thus increases the potential for the enactment of discriminatory entry policies.  
See, e.g., Beaumont, supra note 25 (reporting that after the suicide bombing in 
Haifa the Interior Ministry increased “sixfold” the application fee for residents 
of the West Bank and Gaza seeking residency and citizenship for ‘family re-
unification,’ from $100 to $600, an equivalent of six weeks salary for a mid-
level Palestinian civil servant.).   
 45. See Maharaj, supra note 25 (“The Interior Ministry said it decided to 
stop considering residency requests for Arabs after a suicide bomber attack 
March 31 in a restaurant in the northern port city of Haifa, killing 15 people 
and injuring 44 others.”). 
 46. Id.   
 47. Richard A. Falk and Burns H. Weston, The Relevance of International 
Law to Israeli and Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 125, 
138–39 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992) [hereinafter Falk & Weston]. 
 48. Id. at 137–38. 
 49. Id. at 137.   
 50. Id.  In this context, it is stated by Falk and Weston that: 
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However, the increasingly repressive policies directed at the 
Occupied Territories have often been associated with Israel’s 
annexationist designs in the West Bank and Gaza rather than 
with protecting the security of Israelis and Palestinians.51  In 
addition, the institutionalized nature of Israel’s restrictive prac-
tices in the Occupied Territories coupled with the unprece-
dented length in which such measures have been in place “vir-
tually invalidate any Israeli claim to use force for any reason 
other than the discriminating and proportionate requirement of 
direct defence against attack.”52  Thus, the “freeze”, as a blanket 
measure directed against the millions of Palestinians in the Oc-
cupied Territories without addressing the specific problem of 
“direct defence against attack,” cannot be shielded by a claim of 
military necessity.53   
Even if the “freeze” of all family unification requests is neces-
sary and proportional to the security threat posed by the Pales-
tinian population, an additional requirement must also be met 
before Israel’s practices are to pass muster.  The doctrine of 
“justness or fairness” requires that Israel’s actions necessitated 
by its role as a belligerent occupier must not be “an expression 
of unreasonable or illegitimate purpose.”54  In essence, the re-
  
The whole point of the framework of belligerent occupation is to re-
move this status from the more wide-ranging tolerance of force asso-
ciated with belligerent operations in general – and the more this is 
true the more the occupation is prolonged.  Whatever security con-
cerns Israel may raise in defence of its policies and practices, they 
must bend to this fundamental precept. 
Id. at 139.   
 51. Some examples of restrictive Israeli practices directed towards the 
Palestinians are: 
[E]xtra-judicial demolition and sealing of suspect houses; indiscrimi-
nate administrative detention of individuals without charge or trial 
for renewable periods of six months; intensive interrogations by 
prison personnel coupled with serious beatings and other forms of 
maltreatment and humiliation; the prevention of reunification of 
families; the confiscation of land; the destruction of crops … and the 
diversion of scarce water resources. 
Id.  
 52. Falk & Weston, supra note 42, at 139.   
 53. Id.  For a factual basis of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, 
codifying the “freeze,” see infra p. 1389.    
 54. Id. at 140.  This requirement may be predicated on “the modern-day 
version of the just war doctrine or in some general principal of estoppel recog-
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quirement of “justness or fairness” may prevent a State from 
“bootstrapping the defence of military necessity to exonerate 
acts meant to advance improper or illegal objectives.”55 
Providing evidence of one suicide bombing resulting in fifteen 
fatalities is insufficient to justify a sweeping measure placed 
upon thousands of Palestinians who may not be affiliated with 
any criminal acts against Israel.  Indeed, such violent acts may 
be an invariable response to the suppressive measures imple-
mented by the Israeli Government for the purpose of combating 
such acts.  Therefore, the security justification advanced by the 
Israeli Government may not pass muster as “Israel is estopped 
from pleading a defence in respect of acts that, for the most 
part, its own illegality has provoked, and for which it has ulti-
mately itself to blame.”56  
3.   The Economic Justification: Preventing Further  
Public Expenditures  
Palestinian families successfully entering and residing in Is-
rael are entitled to certain financial and social benefits.57  Thus, 
it is claimed that the growth in payments will present a strain 
on Israel’s economy.58  However, the validity of such a justifica-
tion is limited since any payments made to Israeli citizens or 
residents are largely discretionary.59  In addition, the negative 
  
nized by civilized nations that insists upon ‘clean hands’ in the assertion of 
justificatory claims.”  Id.   
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 142. 
 57. See Hisham Jabr, Financial Administration of the Israeli-Occupied 
West Bank, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES, supra note 47, at 377, 395 (enumerating examples of social bene-
fits paid to Israeli residents such as “payments for widowhood, dependent 
children, general disability, and unemployment….”). 
 58. See Shapiro, supra note 25.    
 59. See, e.g., KRETZMER, supra note 5, at 117 (“Unless bound by statute in 
allocation of benefits, the ministries enjoy a wide degree of discretion in the 
detailed allocation of funds approved in the budget.  Room is thereby created 
for budgeting policies which discriminate between different sectors of the 
population.”).  In terms of local government funding, Kretzmer cites the find-
ings of research conducted by al-Haj and Rosenfeld which “found that in re-
cent years the average ratio of ordinary central government contributions to 
local government budgets in the Jewish and Arab sectors was 3:1.  The ratio 
in development grants was 5:1.”  Id. at 118 (citing M. Al-Haj and H. 
Rosenfeld, Arab Local Government in Israel (Tel Aviv: International Center 
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economic impact allegedly created by an increased immigration 
of Palestinians to Israel is potentially absorbed by Israel’s lop-
sided collection and expenditure policy.60  While the source of 
funding for such benefits is derived equally from Palestinian as 
well as Israeli workers only the latter are entitled to receive any 
benefits.61  Moreover, the Jewish settlements located in the Oc-
cupied Territories are also accorded preferential financial bene-
fits in relation to the rest of the Occupied Territories.62  There-
fore, the claim that Israel’s economy will suffer from a growing 
Palestinian population is subject to many variables, the major-
ity of which weigh in favor of Israel.    
B.   The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law 
Continued concerns by Israelis over their physical, demo-
graphic, and economic security lead to the enactment of the 
  
for Peace in the Middle East 1988)). Once the focus is directed solely at Israeli 
residents the services rendered between the Jewish and Arab sectors are pre-
sumably unequal.  The Arab community constitutes 12 percent of the Israeli 
population but only receives 2.3 percent of the funds distributed to local gov-
ernments from the central government, controlled by the Ministry of Interior.  
Id. at 118. 
 60. See Jabr, supra note 45, at 394 (inferring that the inability of the Min-
ister of Finance to provide statistics on the annual revenues collected from the 
Israeli occupation is actually due to the widely-held belief that “not only is the 
occupation financed by the inhabitants, but that the fiscal burden of occupa-
tion of the West Bank is negative, and that Israel has in fact benefited from 
the occupation”).   
 61. See Jabr, supra note 45, at 395–96.  It is estimated that, since 1970, 
approximately 20 percent of the income of Palestinian workers from the Occu-
pied Territories and employed in Israel, is collected by the Government Em-
ployment Service to pay for social benefits, to which the Palestinian workers 
are not entitled.  Id. at 395.  
 62. Jabr, supra note 45, at 397 (“‘In 1981 alone, when 30,000 settlers lived 
in Judea and Samaria and Gaza, more money was invested on their behalf 
than had been invested for all the Arabs in the previous decade and a half.’”) 
(quoting Haim Ramon, West Bank Data Project, Press Release: Study on 
Population and Public Funding on the West Bank 10 (1985)).  While the cur-
rent analysis of governmental expenditures focuses on Israel proper (Israeli 
territory excluding the Occupied areas), reviewing evidence of lopsided gov-
ernmental funding in the Occupied Territories between the Jewish settle-
ments and the local Arab populations is instructive, as providing further indi-
cation of Israel’s treatment of the Jewish and Arab populations.   
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Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law.63  The Citizenship and 
Entry into Israel Law was passed by a vote of 53 in favor and 25 
against, with one abstention.64  The law states in pertinent part: 
During the period in which this law shall remain in force, de-
spite what is said in any legal provision, including article 7 of 
the Citizenship [Nationality] Law, the Minister of the Interior 
shall not grant the inhabitant of an area citizenship on the ba-
sis of the Citizenship [Nationality] Law, and shall not give him 
a license to reside in Israel on the basis of the Entry into Israel 
Law, and the Area Commander shall not grant a said inhabi-
tant, a permit to stay in Israel, on the basis with the security 
legislation in the area.65 
The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law applies to “inhabi-
tants” of certain areas, namely “Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza 
Strip.”66  An “inhabitant of an area” is defined as “anyone resid-
ing in the area … excluding the inhabitant of an Israeli settle-
  
 63. See generally James Bennet, New Law Raises Obstacles to Israeli-
Palestinian Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at A3, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, Nyt File; Nina Gilbert, Palestinians Who Wed Israelis Will No 
Longer Receive Citizenship, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 1, 2003, at 4A, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, Jpost File; Peter Hirschberg, Israeli Law on Residency 
Criticised as Discriminatory, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 15, 2003, at 10, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, Itimes File; Justin Huggler, Israel Imposes ‘Racist’ 
Marriage Law; Palestinian-Israeli Couples Will Be Forced to Leave or Live 
Apart, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 1, 2003, at 1, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, Indpnt File; Laura King, New Law Aims to Keep Out Palestinian 
Spouses of Israelis; The Measure Passes the Knesset By More Than a 2-1 Ratio.  
Critics Denounce it as Racist, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at 3, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, Lat File; Chris McGreal, Israeli Law Will Split Fami-
lies, Say Critics, GUARDIAN (London), at 15, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
Guardn File; Joshua Mitnick, Israeli Law Targets ‘Mixed’ Families, WASH. 
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, available at http://www.washtimes.com/world/ 
20030818-122330-9856r.htm. 
 64. See Bennet, supra note 63.   
 65. Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law § 2, 5763-2003 (emphasis 
added).   
 66. Id. § 1.  The Judea and Samaria region is defined by the Israeli gov-
ernment as “‘identical in meaning for all purposes … to the term ‘the West 
Bank Region.’”  Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-
Occupied Territories 1967-1988, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note 47, at 25, 41.  The Is-
raeli government’s adherence to the historical titles of Samaria and Judea 
stems from its “rejection of a name that was seen as implying Jordanian sov-
ereignty over the area.”  Id.   
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ment….”67 The ban on obtaining citizenship and residence per-
mits is subject to several exceptions.  Permission to reside in 
Israel may be granted by the Minister of the Interior or Area 
Commander “for the purpose of work, or in order to receive 
medical treatment, [or] for some other temporary purpose” with 
the length of stay limited to six months.68  In order to facilitate 
family unification, residency may also be granted to an “inhabi-
tant of an area” with a child, aged up to twelve, in Israel.69  This 
reservation, however, does not apply to a parent who is illegally 
residing in Israel.70  The other exception to the ban is the discre-
tionary conferral of citizenship or a residence permit by the 
Minster of Interior to an “inhabitant of an area” who identifies 
with the State of Israel and its goals, and has (or a member of 
his family has) “performed a significant act to promote the secu-
rity, economy, or some other important matter of the State,” or 
if the grant is otherwise in the “special interest” of Israel.71  It 
should also be emphasized that the law is only valid for one 
year, and must be reexamined by the Knesset at the end of each 
year in which case the law may be extended for additional one-
year periods.72  In essence, the Citizenship and Entry into Israel 
Law prohibits the inhabitants of certain geographical regions, 
namely the West Bank and Gaza, from obtaining citizenship or 
a permit to reside in Israel.  The Law does not however, facially 
discriminate on the basis of race, religion or sex.73   
  
 67. Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law §1, 5763-2003 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. § 3(1).   
 69. Id.   
 70. This exception would most likely exclude the majority of applicants 
seeking to take advantage of the family unification reservation, id. § 3(1), 
since anyone affected by the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law is pre-
sumably without Israeli citizenship or a valid residence permit and the law 
suspends the application for such methods of entry for all other persons, thus 
rendering them illegal residents of Israel.  In other words, anyone staying 
legally in Israel would not be affected by Citizenship and Entry into Israel 
Law.   
 71. Id. §3(2).   
 72. See id. § 5.   
 73. The Law’s racial motivations and effects will be discussed in further 
detail below.  See infra Part V.A.2.   
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The law also makes an express reference to section 7 of the 
Nationality Law as a now prohibited basis for obtaining citizen-
ship in Israel.74  Section 7 of the Nationality Law provides: 
The spouse of a person who is an Israel national or who has 
applied for Israel nationality and meets or is exempt from the 
requirements of section 5(a), [acquiring citizenship by natu-
ralization] may obtain Israel nationality even if she or he is a 
minor or does not meet the requirements of section 5(a).75    
Prior to the enactment of the Citizenship and Entry into Is-
rael Law, a non-Israeli marrying an Israeli citizen could obtain 
citizenship in Israel by virtue of a spouse being Israeli.76  Fur-
thermore, the non-Israeli spouse seeking Israeli citizenship 
would not be required to meet the conditions otherwise required 
for those seeking Israeli citizenship by naturalization.77  This 
liberalized considerably the scope of persons who were able, le-
gally and practically, to acquire citizenship in Israel.78   Thus, 
the passage of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law struck 
a fatal blow to the hopes of Palestinians seeking unification 
with their spouses in Israel.79  
Proponents of the new law, while conceding the “tragic real-
ity” associated with having to pass such a harsh measure, nev-
ertheless justified its enactment as “a contingency forced by the 
  
 74. See Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law §2, 5763-2003. 
 75. Nationality Law § 7, 5712-1952, 6 L.S.I., at 52. 
 76. A differentiation is made between a Jewish and non-Jewish citizen for 
purposes of obtaining Israeli citizenship vis-à-vis, section 7 of the Nationality 
Law.  In particular, the spouse of a Jewish citizen is “vested” with the rights 
of an oleh under the 1970 Amendment to the Law of Return and thus able to 
acquire citizenship automatically.  See Law of Return (Amendment No. 2) § 1, 
5730-1970, 24 L.S.I., at 28 (amending Law of Return § 4, 5710-1950, 1 L.S.I. 
114 (1951-52)).  The spouse of a non-Jewish citizen, however, “must obtain a 
resident’s visa to live in the country and may acquire citizenship only by way 
of naturalization.”  See KRETZMER, supra note 5, at 47 n.17. 
 77. This applies primarily to persons marrying a non-Jewish citizen since a 
spouse of a Jewish citizen obtains the rights of an oleh and is conferred citi-
zenship automatically.  See Law of Return (Amendment No. 2) § 4(A), 5730-
1970, 24 L.S.I. 28 (1969-70).  See also Jules L. Coleman & Sarah K. Harding, 
Citizenship, the Demands of Justice, and the Moral Relevance of Political Bor-
ders, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 18, 33 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995).   
 78. Nationality Law § 7, 5712-1952, 6 L.S.I., at 52.  
 79. See Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law § 2, 5763-2003.  
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brutality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”80  The justifications 
advanced in support of the Israeli government’s freeze on Pales-
tinian family unification requests were relied upon in defense of 
the newly enacted law.  Thus, the Government again raised its 
security81-demographic82 shield to ward off attacks upon the le-
gality of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law.  And, to 
further enhance its credibility the Government cited to the sta-
tistic that approximately 20 suicide bombing attacks killing 49 
Israelis were attributed to “Palestinians who had entered Israel 
through family unification.”83 
  
 80. King, supra note 63 (reporting the view of Yuri Stern, the head of the 
“parliamentary panel” that advanced the Citizenship law toward its eventual 
passage).  In attempting to downplay the harsh nature of the new Citizenship 
law, Yuri Stern stated that “ ‘[t]his is merely a law that for one year restricts 
the right of Palestinians to settle in our midst.  We are at war.  I hope the war 
will end during this year, but I am not optimistic.’ ”  Id. 
 81. Gideon Starr, a representative of the dominant Likud party and sup-
porter of the new Citizenship Law, cast the law as a “necessary bulwark 
against infiltration by terrorists.”  Bennet, supra note 63.  Another supporter 
of the Citizenship Law, Gideon Ezra, an Israeli cabinet minister, stated that 
“‘[t]his law comes to address a security issue.  Since September 2000 we have 
seen a significant connection, in terror attacks, between Arabs from the West 
Bank and Gaza and Israeli Arabs.’”  Huggler, supra note 63.  The Interior 
Minister, Avraham Poraz sponsored the legislation despite his uneasiness 
associated with the sweeping nature of the law.  Mitnick, supra note 63.  
Speaking through an aide, Mr. Poraz acknowledged that the “law doesn’t dis-
tinguish between those really involved in terrorism and those not involved.  
But because it’s impossible to filter there needs to [be] something sweeping.”  
Id.  
 82. Indeed, many of the arguments made in support of the Government’s 
May 2002 decision to freeze all family unification requests have arisen once 
again as Yuval Steinitz, a Likud party member, reaffirmed the Israeli concern 
that the Palestinians are deliberately attempting to “change the demographic 
balance in Israel in order to destroy [the Jewish majority in Israel].” Bennet, 
supra note 63; Mitnick, supra note 63 (“Some analysts say the law’s signifi-
cance goes beyond national security.  Though designed as a bulwark in Israel’s 
war against Palestinian militants, the [Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law] 
will also serve to limit the growth of Israel’s Arab minority, which makes up 
just under 20 percent of the population.”).  According to MK Azmi Bishara, the 
law “has no connection to security” and “is tied to demography [in which it 
attempts to] limit the number of Arabs in Israel.”   Hirschberg, supra note 63.     
 83. Bennet, supra note 63; Hirschberg, supra note 63.  The Jerusalem Post 
reports that “19 cases of Palestinians, especially in east Jerusalem, who used 
blue identity cards obtained through family reunification to carry out terrorist 
attacks [have] claimed the lives of 87 people.”  Gilbert, supra note 63.   
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Critics have referred to the Citizenship and Entry into Israel 
Law as “a racist measure that threatened to divide thousands of 
families or force them out of Israel.”84  Furthermore, opponents 
claim that the bill contravenes domestic85 and international 
law.86  Indeed, criticism of Israel’s citizenship policy as violating 
international law has come from the highest levels.  The United 
Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion, examining the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, 
adopted a decision which called for Israel to “revoke [the law] 
and reconsider its policy with a view of facilitating family unifi-
cation on a non-discriminatory basis.”87  In particular, the 
  
 84. Bennet, supra note 63; Gilbert, supra note 63 (statement of MK Mu-
hammad Barakei) (“[The Israeli people who have] suffered so much from ra-
cism should be ashamed to bring such a bill.”); Huggler, supra note 63 (state-
ment of Hanny Megally of Human Rights Watch) (“This law blatantly dis-
criminates against Israelis of Palestinian origin and their Palestinian 
spouses.”). 
 85. See Gilbert, supra note 63 (statement of MK Ahmed Tibi) (describing 
the law as “inhumane” as it “bans marriage between Palestinians and Is-
raelis,” contravening the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty); Hirschberg, 
supra, note 63 (describing the argument of human rights groups that the new 
citizenship law violates fundamental Israeli laws and principles such as the 
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and certain principles enunciated in 
Israel’s Declaration of Independence).  Adalah, an independent human rights 
organization in Israel, testified before the Knesset Committee prior to the 
passage of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, challenging the consti-
tutionality of the proposed bill.  Press Release, Adalah: The Legal Center for 
Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Adalah Testifies Before Knesset Committee: 
Proposed Government Bill Imposing Severe Limitations on Family Unification 
is Unconstitutional (July 16, 2003), available at http://www.adalah.org/eng/ 
pressreleases/pr.php?file=03_07_16.  Adalah’s challenge against the proposed 
bill was premised with several points, including the disproportionate nature of 
the law’s potential effects, the lack of a clear factual basis for imposing such a 
measure, and the illicit (demographic) motives behind drafting the law.  Id.   
 86. See Huggler, supra note 63 (statement by Amnesty International) (“A 
law permitting such blatant racial discrimination, on grounds of ethnicity or 
nationality, would clearly violate international human rights law and treaties 
which Israel has ratified and pledged to uphold.”).  
 87. Press Release, U.N. CERD, 63rd Sess., Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination Concludes Sixty-Third Session: Issues Observations 
on Reports of 11 Countries (Aug. 22, 2003), available at http://domino.un.org/ 
UNISPAL.NSF?OpenDatabase.  See also Press Release, U.N. CERD, 63rd 
Sess., Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination Considers Periodic 
Reports From Latvia: Committee Calls on Israel to Revoke Nationality and 
Entry into Israel Law; Appeals to States Parties to Adopt Amendments to 
 
File: Albert4.23.04macro.doc Created on:  4/23/2004 8:07 PM Last Printed: 6/30/2004 6:17 PM 
1366 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:3 
Committee stated in its decision that the Citizenship and Entry 
into Israel Law “raises serious issues under the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation” and the restrictive policy implemented by Israel in May 
2002 has already “adversely affected many families and mar-
riages.”88  Therefore, while Israel’s restrictive citizenship and 
immigration policies have passed muster with the Knesset, its 
foundation remains unstable.89  
  
Article 8 (Aug. 14, 2003), available at http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF? 
OpenDatabase. 
 88. U.N. CERD, 63rd Sess., Decision 2 (63), U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/63/Misc.11/Rev.1 (Aug. 14, 2003), available at http://domino.un.org/ 
UNISPAL.NSF?OpenDatabase.  For information regarding Israel’s status as a 
state party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, see infra text accompanying note 144.   
 89. Several court challenges against the Citizenship and Entry into Israel 
Law as well as the government’s May 2002 “freeze” on family unification ap-
plications are currently pending in the High Court of Justice.  See, e.g., Ina 
Friedman, Three Groups Urge Supreme Court to Strike Down Citizenship 
Law, JERUSALEM REP., Sept. 8, 2003, at 6, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
Jport File; Izenberg, supra note 26; Moshe Reinfeld, ACRI Petitions Court on 
Palestinian Citizenship Amendment, HAARETZ, Sept. 8, 2003, available at 
http://www.haaretz.com.  See also Press Release, ACRI: The Association for 
Civil Rights in Israel, ACRI Petitioned Supreme Court Against Amendment to 
Law of Citizenship (Nov. 10, 2003) (emphasizing in its petition to the Court 
that the new citizenship law “results in a sweeping denial of new requests by 
Israeli citizens for legal status for the Palestinian spouse, and dictates a 
forced separation on numerous families.”), available at http://acri.org.il/ eng-
lish-acri/engine/story.asp?id=152; Press Release, Adalah: The Legal Center for 
Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Supreme Court to Hear Petitions Challenging 
New Law Banning Family Unification (Nov. 6, 2003) (arguing in its petition 
filed on August 4, 2003 that the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law “vio-
lates the constitutionally protected rights of equality, personal liberty to 
maintain a family life, privacy, and due process”), available at 
http://www.adalah.org/eng/pressreleases/pr.php?file=03_11_06; Press Release, 
Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Supreme Court 
to Hear Family Unification Cases Tomorrow (July 16, 2003) (petitioning 
against the government’s May 2002 decision to freeze naturalization requests 
which “severely harms Palestinian citizens of Israel, as overwhelmingly it is 
they who marry Palestinians from the Occupied Territories”), available at 
http://www.adalah.org/eng/pressreleases/pr.php?file=03_07_16-2.    
  The High Court of Justice, recognizing the potential illegality associ-
ated with the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, has issued an interim 
order mandating the Israeli government to set forth its reasons for amending 
the citizenship policy and preventing the unification of families by prohibiting 
a Palestinian spouse of an Israeli citizen from obtaining residency or citizen-
ship status in Israel. See Yuval Yoaz, Court Orders States to Explain Amend-
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IV. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATION OF CITIZENSHIP  
Before embarking on a substantive legal discussion of the 
Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law it is necessary to lay the 
proper foundation for such an analysis.  The premise of this 
Note relies upon the proposition that a State’s ability to confer 
citizenship on certain individuals is not unfettered, but must 
conform to certain international legal norms.90  This section will 
examine the developments which have contributed to the in-
creasing limitations international law has placed upon domestic 
citizenship matters.  It will be argued that international law, at 
its present stage, requires that citizenship policies conform to 
certain international legal norms, particularly international 
human rights law.   
A.    The Traditional View: Exclusive State Jurisdiction in Mat-
ters Relating to Citizenship 
At the end of the Nineteenth Century, authorities and com-
mentators of international law recognized the State as the sole 
arbiter of citizenship.91  Most notably, Oppenheim declared that 
  
ment to Citizenship Law, HAARETZ, Nov. 9, 2003, available at 
http://www.haaretz.com.  Petitions were lodged against the Israeli govern-
ment in the High Court of Justice by Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab 
Minority Rights, ACRI – The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, and Knes-
set members from the Meretz and various Arab parties.  Id.  Additionally, the 
Court issued an injunction preventing the deportation of three Palestinian 
spouses of Israeli citizens who have been illegally residing in Israel since the 
passage of the new citizenship law.  Id.  Due to the importance of the issue, 
the Court will convene “a special session of ‘as broad a panel as possible’ [to] 
hear the petition within a month [from its rulings of November 9, 2003].”  Id. 
 90. This is not advanced as a bright-line rule but as an evolving norm 
within the international community. 
 91. See RUTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 26–28 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that international law commentators from 
the end of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century adopted the 
position that “the determination of nationality is held to be one of the discre-
tionary powers of the sovereign state.”); WEIS, STATELESSNESS, supra note 11, 
at 65 (“Nationality is one of the subjects which are considered as falling 
within the domestic jurisdiction, within the legislative competence, of the 
individual State.  That rule is recognized by both customary and conventional 
international law.”).  Justice Gray accurately summarized the view of the 
international legal community at this time: 
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“[i]t is not for international law but for municipal law to deter-
mine who is and who is not to be considered a subject.”92  This 
rule was based on a logical93 and historical foundation.94   
  
[I]t is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign 
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to its 
self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its do-
minions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such condi-
tions as it may see fit to prescribe.   
RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 63–64, 70–75 (2d ed. 1988) 
(quoting Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)).    
 92. YAFFA ZILBERSHATS, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP 8 (2002) (quot-
ing LASSA F. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW – A TREATISE 348 (1905)).  Cf. 
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 852 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 
9th ed. 1992) (“In principle, and subject to any particular international obliga-
tion which might apply, it is not for international law but for the internal law 
of each State to determine who is, and who is not to be considered its na-
tional.”) (emphasis added), quoted in ZILBERSHATS, supra, at 8.   
 93. The logical premise of reserving the right to determine the identity of 
its citizens to the State is expounded upon by Professor Weis: 
There cannot be any doubt that [the right of a State to determine who 
are its nationals] is a concomitant of State sovereignty.  Sovereignty, 
in its modern conception, is described as the supreme and independ-
ent authority of States over all persons and things in their territory; 
independence and territorial and personal supremacy are considered 
as the elements of sovereignty.  Personal supremacy is the power ex-
ercised by a Sate over its nationals wherever they may be.  The right 
to delimit this group of individuals termed nationals, and to deter-
mine their status in the sense of their rights and duties, is indeed – 
unless personal supremacy were to become co-extensive with territo-
rial supremacy – a prerequisite of personal supremacy and therefore, 
of sovereignty.   
WEIS, STATELESSNESS, supra note 11, at 65.  See also PLENDER, supra note 91, 
at 63 (deconstructing the Grotian theory of the principle of sovereignty in 
relation to the just war doctrine, in which “[o]ne of the two legitimate causes 
for which a sovereign might…engage in war was the defence of the sovereign’s 
own subjects.” Thus, “[i]t followed a fortiori that a sovereign might exclude 
foreigners from his kingdom in defence of the personal or proprietary rights of 
his people.”). 
 94. See PLENDER, supra note 91, at 62–63.  See also DONNER, supra note 91, 
at 6–8 (discussing the doctrine of independence and nonintervention in a 
state’s affairs); WEIS, STATELESSNESS, supra note 11, at 65 (“The right of a 
State to determine who are, and who are not, its nationals is an essential ele-
ment of its sovereignty.  This is recognized by theory and practice.”); Jeffrey L. 
Blackman, State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an 
Effective Nationality Under International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 1141, 
1151 (1998) (“[I]t has long been axiomatic that under international law … 
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Granting States sole discretion in matters of nationality had 
several effects, politically and legally.95  In the political context, 
a State would be shielded from “intervention” by international 
organizations such as the United Nations for its actions relating 
to nationality.96  Similarly, in the legal context, the State would 
not be subject to the scrutiny of international tribunals and 
would essentially have an affirmative defense for actions which 
may offend other States.97  Hence, under the traditional view, a 
State had, for better or worse,98 unfettered authority in the gov-
ernance of matters concerning nationality.   
1.   The Traditional View as Evidenced in Treaties  
and Conventions  
The notion that the sovereign state has sole discretion in de-
termining the identity of its citizens is also evidenced in several 
primary sources of law.  For example, Article 1 of the 1930 Ge-
neva Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict 
of Nationality Laws (hereafter “1930 Hague Convention”) states 
that “[i]t is for each State to determine under its own law who 
are its nationals.”99  In addition, Article 2 provides that “[a]ny 
question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a 
particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law 
of that State.”100  The Protocol Relating to Military Obligations 
in Certain Cases of Double Nationality which accompanied the 
1930 Convention also emphasizes the states’ sovereign power to 
determine the scope and extent of its citizenship policy.101  
  
questions of nationality fall within the domestic jurisdiction of individual 
states.”). 
 95. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF 
PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 52 (1978). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.   
 98. Some of the negative effects produced by the traditional conception of 
regulating nationality, aside from the inevitably discriminatory citizenship 
policies which were implemented by States, were “the anomalies of dual and 
multiple nationality and statelessness.”  Id. at 6. 
 99. Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 99 (1937). 
 100. Id. at 101. 
 101. See Apr. 12, 1930, art. 2, 3, 178 L.N.T.S. 227, 231 (1937).  However, the 
Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 
L.N.T.S. 115 (1937), signed together with the 1930 Hague Convention, does 
not contain any assertion regarding a state’s discretion in citizenship matters. 
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2.   The Traditional View as Evidenced in Judicial Authorities 
The international legal community’s recognition of a state’s 
discretion in devising its own citizenship policy was not only 
evidenced in legislation.  Several decisions handed down by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (hereafter “PCIJ”) 
also affirmed the orthodox approach of international law.  In its 
advisory opinion concerning the Nationality Decrees in Tunis 
and Morocco,102 the PCIJ stated, albeit with qualification, its 
position with respect to a state’s freedom to regulate matters of 
nationality: 
The question of whether a certain matter is or is not solely 
within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative 
question; it depends upon the development of international re-
lations.  Thus, in the present state of international law, ques-
tions of nationality are, in the opinion of the Court, in princi-
ple within this reserved domain.103   
In another advisory opinion issued the same year, the PCIJ 
reaffirmed its previous position, concluding that “generally 
speaking … a sovereign state has the right to decide what per-
sons shall be regarded as its nationals….”104  Hence, it is readily 
  
See also Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 
1954, art. 1, 360 U.N.T.S. 117, 136 (“[T]he term ‘stateless person’ means a 
person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of 
its law.”) (emphasis added).  
 102. Advisory Opinion No. 4, Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, 
1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24.   The question to be answered in the Na-
tionality Decrees case was whether “the nationality Decrees issued in Tunis 
and Morocco [enacted by France] and their application to British nationals” 
was a matter to be regulated by international law or rather, within the exclu-
sive domestic jurisdiction of France.  WEIS, STATELESSNESS, supra note 11, at 
71. While the PCIJ held that the issue in the Tunis and Morocco Nationality 
Decrees case was not solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction, its holding was 
based exclusively on the facts of the case and thus, was not a general pro-
nouncement on the state of international law. See WEIS, STATELESSNESS, supra 
note 11, at 71–73.  For further analysis on the Nationality Decrees in Tunis 
and Morocco case see text accompanying infra notes 119–21. 
 103. It should be noted that the quoted statement “is concerned with the 
competence of the Council of the League of Nations and not with relations of 
nationality in general international law.”  Ian Brownlie, The Relations of Na-
tionality in Public International Law, 39 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 284, 286 (1963).    
 104. Advisory Opinion No. 7, Acquisition of Polish Nationality, 1923 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. B) No. 7, at 16.  See also Advisory Opinion No. 10, Exchange of Greek 
and Turkish Populations, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 10, at 19 (“[T]he national 
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apparent that the maxim of state sovereignty over matters of 
nationality had received wide recognition among the interna-
tional legal community during the late-nineteenth, early twen-
tieth century.   
Domestic case law did not deviate much from the view of the 
international tribunals.  A leading British case that dealt with 
nationality in the context of international law was Stoeck v. 
Public Trustee. 105  In Stoeck, the plaintiff sought a declaratory 
judgment that he was not a German national within the mean-
ing of Article 297 of the Treaty of Versailles and Section 1 of the 
Treaty of Peace Order, thus allowing the plaintiff to dispose of 
certain property without incurring certain additional charges.106  
In holding that the plaintiff was not a German national under 
German or English law, Lord Russell analyzed the underpin-
nings of the traditional view regarding a state’s power to regu-
late matters of nationality: 
Whether a person is a national of a country must be deter-
mined by the municipal law of that country.  Upon this I think 
all text writers are agreed.  It would be strange were it other-
wise.  How could the municipal law of England determine that 
a person is a national of Germany?  It might determine that 
for the purposes of English municipal law a person shall be 
deemed to be a national of Germany, or shall be treated as if 
he were a national of Germany; but that would not constitute 
him a national of Germany, if he were not such according to 
the municipal law of Germany.  In truth there is not and can-
not be such an individual as a German national according to 
English law….107 
Lord Russell’s view was shared by other jurisdictions.  In 
United State v. Wong Kim Ark, the United States Supreme 
  
status of a person belonging to a State can only be based on the law of that 
State.”).  
 105. [1921] 2 Ch. 67. The Stoeck case is also notable for its recognition of the 
phenomenon of the possibility of “statelessness.”  Id. at 79–82.  See also Mus-
grove v. Chun Teeong Toy, 1891 App. Cas. 272, 282–83 (appeal taken from 
Vict.) (holding that an alien had no “legal right, enforceable by action, to enter 
British territory,” in part because rendering such a decision would involve 
“delicate and difficult constitutional questions affecting the respective rights 
of the Crown and Parliament, and the relations of [Britain] to her self-
governing colonies.”).    
 106. Stoeck, [1921] 2 Ch., at 70.  
 107. Id. at 82.  
File: Albert4.23.04macro.doc Created on:  4/23/2004 8:07 PM Last Printed: 6/30/2004 6:17 PM 
1372 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:3 
Court announced a similar rule, recognizing “the inherent right 
of every independent nation to determine for itself and accord-
ing to its own Constitution and laws what classes of persons 
shall be entitled to its citizenship….”108 
B.   The Diminishing Freedom of the State to Govern Matters 
Concerning Nationality 
The armor of domestic sovereignty protecting the State from 
the limitations of international law began to erode during the 
early-to-mid 1900’s.  This section will analyze the gradual es-
tablishment of international law as a recognized restriction 
upon the State’s discretion in determining the identity of its 
citizens, arriving at the conclusion that a State must now ad-
here to certain international legal norms, especially those asso-
ciated with international human rights, when devising its citi-
zenship policies.   
1.   The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating 
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws.   
As the “first comprehensive convention to be devoted entirely 
to issues of citizenship”109 the events preceding the codification 
of the 1930 Hague Convention can be seen as “highly indicative 
of the attitude of States … to the question of the relationship 
between municipal and international law in the field of nation-
ality law.”110  The Preparatory Committee for the Hague Confer-
ence of 1930 for the Codification of International Law requested 
several State governments to provide their view of whether any 
restrictions existed on a state’s sovereign authority to legislate 
  
 108. 169 U.S. 649, 668 (1898).  See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 698, 705–08 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Ex-
clusion Act cases), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 28 
U.S. 99, 162 (3 Pet. 99) (1830) (“Each government [has] a right to decide for 
itself who should be admitted or deemed citizens.”).  It should be noted that 
these cases have not been overruled by the Supreme Court and is still consid-
ered good law.  See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: 
Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 6–7 (1998) (explaining that the “plenary power doctrine” espoused by 
the Court in the Chinese Exclusion Act cases “is said to make racial discrimi-
nation in the immigration context lawful per se.”).  
 109. ZILBERSHATS, supra note 92, at 12. 
 110. See WEIS STATELESSNESS, supra note 11, at 82.   
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with respect to matters of nationality.111  The government of the 
United Kingdom replied:  
The mere fact … that nationality falls in general within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a State does not exclude the possibility 
that the right of the State to use its discretion in legislating 
with regard to nationality may be restricted by duties which it 
owes to other States [citing the Nationality Decrees in Tunis 
and Morocco case]. […]  It is only in exceptional cases that this 
divergence between the right of States to legislate at its dis-
cretion with regard to the enjoyment or non-enjoyment of its 
nationality and the duty of other States to recognise such leg-
islation would occur.  The criterion is that the legislation must 
infringe the rights of the State as apart from its interests.112 
In response to the same question, the United States govern-
ment answered: 
While, as indicated, the Government of the United States has 
always recognised the fact that the acquisition or loss of the 
nationality of a particular State are matters which pertain 
primarily to domestic policy and are therefore to be deter-
mined by the domestic law of that State, it does not admit that 
a State is subject to no limitations in conferring its nationality 
on individuals. […]  [N]o State is free to extend the application 
of its laws of nationality in such a way as to reach out and 
claim the allegiance of whomsoever it pleases.  The scope of 
municipal laws governing nationality must be considered as 
limited by consideration of the rights and obligations of indi-
viduals and of other States.113   
The above statements as well as those of the majority of the 
other responding States represents the budding acceptance of 
  
 111. Id.  The following statements by the governments of the United King-
dom and the United States while not itself a source of international law con-
stitutes “proof of the practice of individual States in matters of nationality 
which itself is a source for the ascertainment of international law.  [In addi-
tion the statements also] contain important information as to existing inter-
national law in the field of nationality.”  Id. at 28 (emphasis added).      
 112. Id. at 82 (quoting League of Nations, Hague Conference for the Codifi-
cation of International Law, Bases of Discussion drawn up by the Preparatory 
Committee (1929), League of Nations Doc. C. 73, M. 38, at 118).   
 113. Id. at 83 (quoting League of Nations, Hague Conference for the Codifi-
cation of International Law, Bases of Discussion drawn up by the Preparatory 
Committee (1929), League of Nations Doc. C. 73, M. 38, at 16, 145–46).   
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the principle “that [a State’s] right to determine nationality was 
not unlimited.”114       
The 1930 Hague Convention itself also provides evidence of 
the diminishing authority of a State regarding questions of na-
tionality.  As stated above, Article 1 of the 1930 Hague Conven-
tion affirms the age-old principle that “[i]t is for a State to de-
termine under its own law who are its nationals.”115  However, 
in an important reservation immediately following this state-
ment, the Convention also mandates that “[t]his law shall be 
recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with in-
ternational conventions, international custom, and the principle 
of law generally recognised with regard to nationality.”116  Thus, 
taken as a whole, Article 1 explicitly provides for a limitation, 
  
 114. Brownlie, supra note 103, at 298.  See also WEIS, STATELESSNESS, supra 
note 11, at 83 (listing Austria, Czechoslovakia, Demark, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and South Africa as States “recognis[ing] [ex-
plicitly] that the right to determine nationality was not unlimited.”).  Article 2 
of the Harvard Research Draft Convention on the Law of Nationality, 1929, 
prepared in anticipation of the International Conference on the Codification of 
International Law, provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in this convention, each state may de-
termine by its law who are its nationals, subject to the provisions of 
any special treaty to which a state may be a party; but under interna-
tional law the power of a state to confer its nationality is not unlim-
ited. 
23 AM. J. INT’L. L. SPEC. SUP. 1, 13 (1929).  The explanatory comments accom-
panying Article 2 delineate certain situations in which matters of nationality 
may be ripe for regulation by international law, i.e., when the nationality laws 
of one State conflicts with another state or when States voluntarily enter into 
treaties governing the conferral of nationality among the State parties.  See 
id. at 24–25.  In its most general statement regarding the relationship be-
tween international law and State law in the field of nationality law the ex-
planatory comments on Article 2 of the Draft Convention provides: 
It may be difficult to precise the limitations which exist in interna-
tional law upon the power of a state to confer its nationality.  Yet it is 
obvious that some limitations do exist.  They are based upon the his-
torical development of international law and upon the fact that dif-
ferent states may be interested in the allegiance of the same natural 
persons. 
Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
 115. Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of National-
ity Laws art. 1, supra note 99, at 99 (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. (emphasis added). 
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through international law, on a State’s discretion in determin-
ing its nationals.117     
It is evident from the work of the Preparatory Committee as 
well as the resulting 1930 Hague Convention that the interna-
tional community no longer regarded the State as the sole arbi-
ter in matters relating to nationality.  Moreover, both the views 
of the various States elicited by the Preparatory Committee and 
the subsequent codification of such views in the 1930 Hague 
Convention constitute evidence of the prevailing relevance of 
international law in matters of nationality.  
2.   Opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
and the International Court of Justice – Limiting a State’s  
Ability to Devise Its Own Citizenship Policy 
During the period in which the opinions of the PCIJ cited 
above were handed down118 international law emphasized the 
traditional view of exclusive domestic jurisdiction over matters 
of nationality.  Nonetheless, one must recognize that the PCIJ, 
in the same opinions, qualified the potential reach of the tradi-
tional rule.  For example, in its advisory opinion concerning the 
Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco, the PCIJ 
found that whether France had exclusive domestic jurisdiction 
over the conferral of French nationality upon residents of Tunis 
and Morocco was “essentially a relative question; depend[ing] 
upon the development of international relations.”119  While the 
PCIJ found that questions of nationality were indeed within the 
sole jurisdiction of the State during the period in which the case 
was decided, it emphasized that “the right of a State to use its 
discretion [in matters of nationality was] restricted by obliga-
tions which it may have undertaken towards other States.”120  
  
 117. Brownlie, supra note 103, at 299.  It should be noted that the 1930 
Hague Convention and its accompanying Protocols “make law only as between 
the contracting States” and do not make “general or universal, international 
law.” WEIS, STATELESSNESS, supra note 11, at 27.  Nonetheless, the “indirect 
significance [of the 1930 Hague Convention] is considerable, as [it] may be 
taken to reflect the views of two-thirds, or at least of the majority, of the Gov-
ernments represented at the [International Conference on the Codification of 
International Law].”  Id.   
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 102–04.   
 119. 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (emphasis added).   
 120. Id.   
File: Albert4.23.04macro.doc Created on:  4/23/2004 8:07 PM Last Printed: 6/30/2004 6:17 PM 
1376 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:3 
Therefore, it can be said that even though situations exist 
where a State, “in principle,” retains sole jurisdiction to regu-
late certain matters, such discretion is invariably “limited by 
rules of international law.”121  In its advisory opinion on the Ac-
quisition of Polish Nationality, the PCIJ reaffirmed its position 
regarding the ability of international law to limit a state’s dis-
cretion in determining who shall be a national.122  
One may notice two important aspects of the advisory opin-
ions cited above.  First, it is evident that during the period in 
which the cases were decided the international community still 
regarded the regulation of nationality as within the exclusive 
domain of the State.  However, it should be no less apparent 
that the PCIJ, during the same period, also regarded interna-
tional law, not as de minimis in its limiting effect, but as a vi-
able check upon a State’s discretion in the field of nationality 
law, in which the strength of any such limitation is governed by 
the evolution of international relations.123   
  
 121. Id.  There are two important corollaries regarding the holding and 
statements of the PCIJ in the Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco case.  
First, as stated above, the PCIJ’s holding is limited to the facts of the case 
which involved the scope of sovereignty exercised by a Protecting State in a 
Protectorate and the invocation of international agreements.  WEIS, 
STATELESSNESS, supra note 11, at 73.  Second, the resolution of the dispute 
reached after the issuance of the PCIJ opinion is indicative of an emerging 
limitation vis-à-vis international law on a domestic discretion in regulating 
matters of nationality.  Id. at 75.  An agreement was reached between Britain 
and France, providing the residents of Tunis and Morocco, who would have 
been subjected to France’s “unilateral imposition” of French nationality, the 
right of an “option” to choose between British or French nationality.  Id. at 
74–75.  This resolution signified an emerging limitation imposed by interna-
tional law emerged on a State’s discretion in the “compulsory conferral” of 
nationality.  See id. at 75, 107.   
 122. 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7, at 16 (“Though, generally speaking, it is 
true that a sovereign State has the right to decide what persons shall be re-
garded as its nationals, it is no less true that this principle is applicable only 
subject to the [relevant] Treaty obligations [of the disputing States].”). 
 123. See 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24.  For an examination of the deci-
sions of other international courts regarding the question of nationality see 
WEIS STATELESSNESS, supra note 11, at 75–78.  See also Brownlie, supra note 
103, at 301 (listing several eminent jurists who adopt the view that matters of 
nationality are regulated by international law).   
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3.   Opinions of the Regional Courts – An Emerging Human 
Rights Approach to Regulating Citizenship Policies 
The position of the PCIJ and the ICJ is also echoed in the 
several opinions of regional courts concerning nationality laws.  
Most notably, in the Advisory Opinion concerning the Proposed 
Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitu-
tion of Costa Rica, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
upon request by the Costa Rican Government, issued an advi-
sory opinion on whether certain proposed amendments to the 
Constitution of Costa Rica governing nationality were in con-
formance with article 17 (rights to family), article 20 (right to 
nationality), and article 24 (right to equal protection) of the 
American Convention on Human Rights.124  Before determining 
whether the proposed amendments contravened any relevant 
provision in the American Convention on Human Rights, the 
Court provided a brief survey of the evolving relationship be-
tween international law and domestic regulation of nationality 
matters: 
[D]espite the fact that it is traditionally accepted that the con-
ferral and regulation of nationality are matters for each state 
to decide, contemporary developments indicate that interna-
tional law does impose certain limits on the broad powers en-
joyed by the states in that area, and that the manners in 
which states regulate matters bearing on nationality cannot 
today be deemed within their sole jurisdiction; those powers of 
the state are also circumscribed by their obligations to ensure 
the full protection of human rights.  [Thus,] [t]he classical doc-
trinal position, which viewed nationality as an attribute 
granted by the state to its subjects, has gradually evolved to 
  
 124. Advisory Opinion concerning Proposed Amendments to the Naturaliza-
tion Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. paras. 1-8, 
OC-4/84/ser. A/No. 4 (1984).  The proposed amendments to the Costa Rican 
Constitution essentially allowed members of certain racial and ethnic groups 
preferential treatment in obtaining Costa Rican citizenship over other aliens.  
Id. at para. 39.  Thus, the Court noted the possible motivations in Costa Rica’s 
drafting of the proposed amendments, which may have involved a “negative 
nationalistic reaction…to the problem of refugees, particularly Central Ameri-
can refugees.”  Id. at para. 40.     
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the point that nationality is today perceived as involving the 
jurisdiction of the state as well as human rights issues.125   
This statement by the Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights is indicative of the current trend in international law 
requiring domestic compliance with human rights norms in 
matters of nationality and immigration.   
The European Court of Human Rights as well as its predeces-
sor, the European Commission of Human Rights, have also at-
tempted to reconcile the conflict between domestic jurisdiction 
over citizenship policies with the possible limitations imposed 
  
 125. Id. at paras. 32, 33.  In proceeding to “reconcile the principle that the 
conferral and regulation of nationality fall within the jurisdiction of the state 
… with the further principle that international law imposes certain limits on 
the state’s power, which limits are linked to the demands of [international 
human rights law]” the Court ultimately struck the balance in favor of Costa 
Rica, stating that: 
[I]t is within the sovereign power of Costa Rica to decide what stan-
dards should determine the granting or denial of nationality to aliens 
who seek it, and to establish certain reasonable differentiations based 
on factual differences which, viewed objectively, recognize that some 
applicants have a closer affinity than others to Costa Rica’s value 
system and interests.  
Id. at para. 59 (emphasis added).  Thus, the Court found that “the preferential 
treatment in the acquisition of Costa Rican nationality … which favors Cen-
tral Americans, Ibero-Americans and Spaniards over other aliens, does not 
constitute discrimination contrary to the [American Convention on Human 
Rights].”  Id. at para. 2 (conclusion of opinion).  One may argue that the 
Court’s holding seems to undermine the force of its statements regarding the 
increasing role of international law in regulating a State’s implementation of 
its citizenship policies in a human rights context, and thus, supports the 
proposition that States may continue to enact restrictive citizenship policies.  
However, the Court reached its holding primarily on the basis of its concern 
that Costa Rica should be allowed to determine who would have the closest 
“historical, cultural, and spiritual bonds” with the Costa Rican people, and 
hence would be conferred expedited naturalization procedures to obtain Costa 
Rican citizenship over other aliens.  Id. at para. 60.  The Court did not opine 
upon a State’s outright refusal to admit persons of a certain ethnic or racial 
group with presumably a strong bond, i.e., a spouse in the naturalizing coun-
try, due to demographic, economic, or national security concerns and whether 
such a policy would potentially be subject to greater scrutiny or be deemed per 
se discriminatory under international human rights law.  Moreover, the Court 
was steadfast in its insistence that any differential treatment with relation to 
citizenship policies be supported by factual differences which are objectively 
reasonable, the touchstone of the principles of non-discrimination and equal 
protection of the law.  See id. at paras. 57–60.   
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upon such policies by international human rights law.126  Two 
opinions handed down by the Commission and the Court in 
1973 and 1985 respectively, provide evidence that State discre-
tion in devising citizenship policies is not unfettered but subor-
dinate to its treaty obligations.  The Commission, in East Afri-
can Asians v. United Kingdom, considered the applications of 
several residents of former British colonies in East Africa who 
were refused admission to the United Kingdom even though the 
applicants were British citizens.127  In ruling against the United 
Kingdom, the Commission found that the citizenship and immi-
gration policies at issue contravened the European Convention 
on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
as discriminatory on the basis of race and sex, interfering with 
the right to respect for family life.128  
Similarly, in the leading case of Abdulaziz v. United King-
dom, the Court found that the British government breached 
Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
by implementing a discriminatory immigration policy which 
infringed upon the applicants’ right to respect for their family 
lives.129  It is important to emphasize however, that even though 
the Court found Britain’s various immigration policies illegal, 
the Court continued to adhere to the traditional notion that “as 
a matter of well-established international law and subject to its 
  
 126. See generally Nicola Rogers, Immigration and the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights: Are New Principles Emerging, 2003 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 53 (2003).   
 127. See East African Asians v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 4403/70-
4419/70, 4422/70, 4434/70, 4443/70, 4476/70-4478/70, 4486/70, 4501/70, 
4526/70-4530/70, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 76 (1973) (Commission report).  
 128. See id. at 83, 91.  
 129. See Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81 and 
9474/81, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471, 499–504, paras. 74–83 (1985) (Court judg-
ment). The Court found that the effect of the 1980 Immigration Rules as ap-
plied to the applicants, which made it “easier for a man settled in the United 
Kingdom than for a woman so settled to obtain permission for his or her non-
national spouse to enter or remain in the [United Kingdom] for settlement,” to 
be in contravention with the European Convention on Human Rights.  Id. at 
499, para. 74. In considering the admissibility of the applications the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights reached a similar holding as the Court, 
finding a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for family life) in conjunction 
with a violation of Article 14’s prohibition on sexual discrimination.  See Ab-
dulaziz v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81, 6 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 28, 41, para. 109 (1983) (Commission Report). 
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treaty obligations, a State has the right to control entry of non-
nationals into its territory.”130  However, the Court’s later juris-
prudence signaled a retreat from the traditional position, 
broaching the idea that a State must adhere to human rights 
norms in enacting its citizenship and immigration policies: 
[T]he Convention does not in principle prohibit Contracting 
States from regulating the entry and length of stay of aliens.  
Nevertheless, the Court also reiterates that, while [Article 8] 
contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision 
making process leading to measures of interference must be 
fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safe-
guarded by [Article 8].131 
The East African Asians and Abdulaziz opinions also laid the 
foundation for the Court to consider subsequent cases involving 
challenges to the legality of the Contracting States’ citizenship 
and immigration policies as violating the right to respect for 
family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights.132   
  
 130. Abdulaziz, Eur. H.R. Rep., at 497, para. 67.  In further restricting the 
applicability of its decision, the Abdulaziz court stated that “[t]he duty im-
posed by Article 8 cannot be considered as extending to a general obligation on 
the part of a Contracting State to respect the choice by married couples of the 
country of their matrimonial residence and to accept the non-national spouses 
for settlement in that country.  Id. at 497, para. 68.  This lead to the eventual 
creation, in the Court’s jurisprudence, of a distinction between a State’s nega-
tive obligation to refrain from expulsion of non-nationals already residing 
within a State and a State’s positive obligation to admit a non-national to 
reside within a State, in which the latter duty was “less established,” accord-
ing the States a “margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken 
to ensure compliance.” See Rogers, supra note 126, at 59 (footnote omitted).   
 131. See Rogers, supra note 126, at 60 (quoting Ciliz v. Netherlands, App. 
No. 29192/95, para. 66 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jul. 11, 2000), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudoc1doc2/HEJUD/200207/ciliz.batj.doc). 
 132. See, e.g., Yildiz v. Austria, App. No. 37295/97, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 
(2002) (finding breach of Article 8); Amrollahi v. Denmark, App. No. 56811/00 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Jul. 11, 2002) (finding breach of Article 8), available at 
http://www.sbg.ac.at/oim/orig/02_4/Amrollahi%20v%20DK.PDF; Sen v. Neth-
erlands, App. No. 31465/96, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 7 (2001) (finding breach of Arti-
cle 8); Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50 (2001) 
(finding breach of Article 8); Ahmut v. Netherlands, App. No. 21702/93, 24 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 62 (1996) (finding no breach of Article 8); Boughanemi v. 
France, App. No. 22070/93, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 228 (1996) (finding no breach of 
Article 8); Gül v. Switzerland, App. No. 23218/94, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 93 (1996) 
(finding no breach of Article 8).   
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4.   The Present State of International Law in Regulating a 
State’s Citizenship Policies   
The central argument of this Note is that the Citizenship and 
Entry into Israel Law is in direct contravention with legal du-
ties imposed upon Israel vis-à-vis its treaty obligations and also 
customary international law, and thus, must be amended or 
perhaps more practically, repealed.  As a result, the threshold 
question of whether international law imposes any limitations 
at all upon a State’s discretion in the determination of who may 
or may not become its national must be answered.  One may 
arrive at several conclusions from the preceding survey and 
analysis of the various international legal authorities dealing 
with the extent international law may be able to circumscribe 
nationality policies.  First, States still retain considerable au-
thority in regulating matters of nationality which necessarily 
result in measures based on race or ethnicity.  Second, domestic 
jurisdiction over nationality policies is not impermeable and 
will, in certain situations, bend to the mandates of international 
legal norms.  Third, a State, at a minimum, must not breach its 
treaty obligations when devising and implementing its citizen-
ship policies.  And fourth, international human rights law is 
emerging as an effective supplement to treaty obligations in 
piercing the State’s veil of domestic jurisdiction over nationality 
matters.  
V.  EXAMINING THE CITIZENSHIP AND ENTRY INTO ISRAEL LAW 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW  
A.   The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law: Potential  
Violation of Specific Rights Under International Human 
Rights Law 
Whereas traditional international law focused primarily on 
the rights and duties of the State,133 the basic premise underly-
  
 133. Professor Henkin, describing the development of international human 
rights law, offered the following characterization of the state of international 
law prior to the establishment of the modern human rights regime: 
[F]or hundreds of years international law and the law governing in-
dividual life did not come together.  International Law, true to its 
name, was law only between States, governing only relations between 
States on the State level.  What a State did inside its borders in rela-
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ing human rights law is that the “individual is to have direct 
rights and duties in international law.”134  The focus upon pro-
moting human rights intensified after the discovery of the nu-
merous atrocities which took place during World War II.135  
Thus, the United Nations which came into being after World 
War II, declared as one of its purposes, “promoting and encour-
aging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, or religion.”136  While 
  
tion to its own nationals remained its own affair, an element of its 
autonomy, a matter of its ‘domestic jurisdiction.’ 
Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, in 216 COL-
LECTED COURSES OF HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (vol. 4) 13, 209 
(1989). 
 134. DONNER, supra note 91, at 183 (emphasis added).  In a particularly 
powerful statement by Judge Tanaka concerning the universality and unique-
ness of human rights as a body of law that is separate and distinct from any 
other body of law which may require recognition from States it was stated: 
Human rights have always existed with the human being.  They ex-
isted independently of, and before, the State.  Alien and even state-
less persons must not be deprived of them.  […] There must be no le-
gal vacuum in the protection of human rights.  Who can believe, as a 
reasonable man, that the existence of human rights depends upon the 
internal or international legislative measures, etc., of the State and 
that accordingly they can be validly abolished or modified by the 
State? 
South West Africa Cases (Second Phase) (Eth. v. S. Afr. & Liber. v. S. Afr.), 
1966 I.C.J. 6, 297–98 (July 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka).   
 135. The birth of the modern human rights movement can be traced to the 
London Agreement and the accompanying Nuremberg Charter, signed by the 
Allied Powers on August 8, 1945, which allowed for the imposition of “individ-
ual responsibility” against persons violating certain international crimes per-
petrated during World War II.  See Agreement between the United States of 
America and the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respecting the 
prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, 
Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472 [hereinafter Nuremberg 
Charter]. See also JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, 
ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED APPROACH 408 (2002) (explaining that 
in the context of human rights violations “[r]eliance on the doctrine of state 
responsibility was clearly insufficient to deal with abuses committed by a 
state against its own nationals since no state could be expected to bring an 
action against itself.”  Thus, the post-World War II decision by the Allied 
Powers to bring to justice those individuals who committed atrocities during 
the war “marked a turning point in attitudes toward the individual’s status in 
international law.”).   
 136. U.N. Charter art. 1 para. 3.   
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the Charter does not enumerate the various “human rights” 
which are to be protected by the Member States it has been said 
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights137 (hereafter 
“Declaration”) is an amendment to the U.N. Charter in this re-
spect.138  Thus, it may be argued that a violation of a right enu-
merated in the Declaration is a fortiori a violation of the U.N. 
Charter.  Moreover, certain human rights obligations, especially 
those prohibiting State sponsored “systematic racial discrimina-
tion” have attained the status of customary international law.139  
As the seminal document on human rights, The Declaration 
shall provide a framework for the ensuing analysis of the legal-
ity of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law.  In particular 
it will be argued that the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law 
violates the right of equal protection and prohibition against 
  
 137. See generally G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Pt. I, Resolutions, 
at 71-79, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/ 
rights.html [hereinafter Declaration].  It is still debated whether the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights is legally binding, as evidenced in the lan-
guage of the Preamble where the States are called upon to “teach,” “educate,” 
and “promote” respect for human rights rather than “safeguard,” “protect” and 
“guarantee” human rights, see DONNER, supra note 91, at 191, as well as its 
nature as a General Assembly resolution.  Nonetheless, the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights “has force as a morally … binding document [in 
which] its authority is enhanced by the universality of its acceptance by Mem-
bers of the United Nations.”  Id.  If any question remains regarding the sig-
nificance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the statement by Vere 
Evatt of Australia, President of the General Assembly, made at the time of the 
adoption of the Declaration may put the matter to rest: “It is the first occasion 
on which the organized community of nations has made a declaration of hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms, and it has the authority of the body of 
opinion of the United Nations as a whole…”  Id. at 189 (quoting The Impact of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Dep’t of Social Affairs, at 7, 
U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/5/Rev.1 (June 29, 1953)). 
 138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN  RELATIONS LAW § 701 cmt. d (1987) 
(“Almost all states are parties to the United Nations Charter, which contains 
human rights obligations.  There has been no authoritative determination of 
the full content of those obligations, but it has been increasingly accepted that 
states parties to the Charter are legally obligated to respect some of the rights 
recognized in the Universal Declaration.”). 
 139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702(f).  In clarifying 
the scope of the “systematic racial discrimination” covered under customary 
international law of human rights, the Restatement provides that “[r]acial 
discrimination is a violation of customary law when it is practiced systemati-
cally as a matter of state policy, e.g., apartheid in the Republic of South Af-
rica.”  Id. § 702 cmt. i.     
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discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin140 as 
applied to the right against arbitrary interference with the fam-
ily; 141 and the right to protection of the family as the fundamen-
tal unit of society.142 
Since there is no definitive answer on whether the Declara-
tion is legally binding, this Note will also focus upon two human 
rights conventions governing the legality of the Citizenship and 
Entry into Israel Law; the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (hereafter “ICCPR”)143 and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation (hereafter “CERD”).144 
  
 140. Declaration, supra note 137, art. 2 & 7. 
 141. Declaration, supra note 137, art. 12. 
 142. Declaration, supra note 137, art. 16. 
 143. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter 
ICCPR]. Israel became a signatory to the ICCPR on December 19, 1966 and 
ratified the ICCPR on October 3, 1991. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited 
With the Secretary-General, Status as at Dec. 31, 2002 at 164, U.N. Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.E/21, U.N. Sales No. E.03.V.3 (2002). Israel also indicated its 
reservation with Article 23: 
With reference to Article 23 of the [ICCPR], and any other provision 
thereof to which the present reservation may be relevant, matters of 
personal status are governed in Israel by the religious law of the par-
ties concerned.   
To the extent that such law is inconsistent with its obligations under 
the Covenant, Israel reserves the right to apply that law. 
Id. at 169.  Article 23 provides in pertinent part: 
1.  The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 
2.  The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to 
found a family shall be recognized.   
[…] 
4.  States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate 
steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to 
marriage, during marriage, and at its dissolution.   
ICCPR, supra note 143, at 179. 
 144. See generally International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter CERD]. Israel became a signatory to the CERD on 
March 7, 1966 and ratified the CERD on January 3, 1979.  See Multilateral 
Treaties Deposited With the Secretary-General, Status as at Dec. 31, 2002 at 
131, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/21, U.N. Sales No. E.03.V.3 (2002). Israel also 
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1.   Application of Human Rights Law to Territories Under 
Military Occupation 
Since the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law is directed at 
persons residing within certain “areas,”145 which are deemed 
Israeli-occupied territories resulting from the Arab-Israeli War 
of June 1967,146 one must determine whether human rights law 
is applicable in circumstances of military occupation in which 
armed conflict may be present.  The overriding concern with the 
application of human rights law to regions under military occu-
pation is that “human rights law – unlike international hu-
manitarian law – applies in peacetime, and many of its provi-
sions may be suspended during an armed conflict.”147   
One issue that arises is the “convergence of humanitarian law 
and human rights law” in the context of military occupation.148  
Whereas the applicability of humanitarian law in situations of 
military occupation is undisputed,149 it is less clear whether hu-
  
submitted a reservation upon ratification, stating that “[t]he State of Israel 
does not consider itself bound by the provisions of article 22 of the [CERD].”  
Id. at 135.  Article 22 of the CERD provides: 
Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to in-
terpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by 
negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Con-
vention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be 
referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the 
disputants agree to another mode of settlement. 
CERD, supra note 144, at 238. 
 145. As stated above, the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law applies 
exclusively to an “inhabitant of an area” in which the “area” is designated in 
the law as the West Bank and Gaza.  Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law § 
1, 5763-2003.   
 146. See Roberts, supra note 66, at 40–41.   
 147. International Committee of the Red Cross, Fact Sheet: What is Inter-
national Humanitarian Law? (“Fact sheet providing a summary description of 
the sources, content and field of application of international humanitarian 
law.”), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList2/ Hu-
manitarian_law:IHL_in_brief?OpenDocument [hereinafter ICRC Fact Sheet]. 
 148. John Dugard, Enforcement of Human Rights in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES, supra note 47, at 461, 467.  
 149. International humanitarian law is defined by the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross as “a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian rea-
sons, to limit the effects of armed conflict.”  ICRC Fact Sheet, supra note 147.  
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 which mark an important milestone in the 
codification of international humanitarian law and may be viewed, with its 
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man rights law exudes an equally strong legal force.150  In par-
ticular, occupying States must often derogate from its obliga-
tions under human rights law because of the threat to public 
safety in times of armed conflict.151  Thus, the raison d’etre of 
enforcing human rights law, to protect the fundamental rights 
of individuals, is essentially compromised where a State is al-
lowed to and often does derogate from its obligations during 
armed conflict.   
Indeed, the Israeli Government has seized upon the deficien-
cies in sustaining a viable military occupation while protecting 
fundamental human rights to advance its preference for apply-
ing only humanitarian law to the Occupied Territories.152  In 
  
almost universal acceptance, as customary international law, see Roberts, 
supra note 66, at 35, expressly provide for its application “to all cases of par-
tial or total occupation … even if the said occupation meets with no armed 
resistance.”  See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T.S. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287, 288.  [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].  The other three Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 all contain the same Articles 1 through 4 including Arti-
cle 2 as cited above.  
 150. For an analysis of the applicability of human rights law to military 
occupations, and more specifically, to the Israeli Occupied Territories see Rob-
erts, supra note 66, at 53–57. The U.N. General Assembly has consistently 
stated that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is applicable to the 
territories occupied by Israel.  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3005, U.N. GAOR, 27th 
Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 30–31, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 2851, U.N. 
GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 48–49, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 
2727, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 36–37, U.N. Doc. A/8028 
(1970); G.A. Res. 2443, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 50, U.N. Doc. 
A/7218 (1968).   
 151. See ESTHER COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES: 1967-1982  5 (1985). 
 152. In support of its position that only humanitarian law applies to the 
occupied territories, the Israeli government has viewed the “unique political 
circumstances” in addition to the “emotional realities” existing in the occupied 
territories as “clearly not a classical situation in which the normal compo-
nents of ‘human rights law’ may be applied….”  Roberts, supra note 66, at 55 
(quoting Memorandum from the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Israeli For-
eign Ministry (Sept. 12, 1984) (written in response the author’s inquiry con-
cerning the applicability of various human rights conventions to the occupied 
territories).  In the view of the Israeli government, the lack of ‘the relationship 
between the ‘citizen’ and his government present in “any standard, democratic 
system” renders the occupied territories as unsuited for the application of 
human rights law.  Id.  It argued further that only humanitarian law, “which 
balances the needs of humanity with the requirements of international law to 
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addition, the absence of any definitive opinion regarding the 
compatibility of human rights law to situations of military oc-
cupation substantiates the Israeli position.153   
Nonetheless, the unique nature of Israel’s prolonged occupa-
tion of the West Bank and Gaza warrants a reconsideration of 
the argument that the “classical” situation for applying human 
rights law does not exist in the Israeli-occupied territories, or at 
least, the situation as it currently stands is ill suited for the 
application of human rights law.  The traditional conception of 
a military occupation was that the occupying state would tem-
porarily control the occupied state until the disputing parties 
reached a mutual agreement or some other shift occurred in the 
  
administer the [occupied territories] whilst maintaining public order, safety, 
and security” should be applied.  Id.   
 153. Two notable cases before international tribunals lend tacit support to 
the proposition that international human rights law is applicable in situations 
of military occupations.  First, in the advisory opinion issued by the ICJ on the 
legal consequences of South Africa’s occupation of Namibia member States of 
the United Nations were advised to refrain “from entering into treaty rela-
tions with South Africa in all cases in which the Government of South Africa 
purports to act on behalf of or concerning Namibia” and also abstain from 
“invoking or applying” any existing bilateral treaties entered into “by South 
Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia which involve active intergovern-
mental cooperation.” Legal Consequences For States of the Continued Pres-
ence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Secu-
rity Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 55, ¶ 122 (Advisory Opinion of 
Jun. 21).  However, the ICJ added an important exception to the above prohi-
bitions stating that “certain general conventions such as those of humanitar-
ian character” in which “the non-performance of may adversely affect the peo-
ple of Namibia” should continue to be recognized and adhered to.  Id. (empha-
sis added).  The European Commission of Human Rights’s ruling in the ad-
mission of applications by the Cyprus government regarding the Turkish oc-
cupation of Cyprus also affirms the applicability of human rights law in situa-
tions of military occupations. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 4 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 482, 509, para. 83 (1976) (Commission Report) (finding that 
under Article 1 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Turkey was responsible for its obligations 
under the Convention as long as Turkish armed forces “brought any persons 
or property [in Cyprus] within the jurisdiction of Turkey … to the extent that 
they exercise[d] control over such persons or property.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  See also Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 8007/77, 15 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 509, 522–23, para. 63 (1983) (Commission Report) (reaffirming the re-
sponsibility of Turkey to comply with the Convention in its military occupa-
tion of Turkey).   
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sovereign control of the occupied state.154  This was the scenario 
envisioned by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
which “was designed to protect the civilian population under an 
essentially temporary occupation.”155  However, the situation sui 
generis created by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza requires that the application of humanitarian law be sup-
plemented with human rights law in order to adequately pro-
tect the rights of those under occupied rule.156   
  
 154. See Roberts, supra note 66, at 28 (concluding that the applicability of 
the law of occupations assumes “that military occupation is a provisional state 
of affairs, which may end as the fortunes of war change, or else will be trans-
formed into some other status through negotiations conducted at or soon after 
the end of the war”).  See also COHEN, supra note 151, at 189 (“[T]he occu-
pant’s power is circumscribed by the conventional law of belligerent occupa-
tion and by the underlying customary principle that the occupant is not the 
sovereign in the occupied territory and may not annex it.”).   
 155. COHEN, supra note 151, at 29.   
 156. See Dugard, supra note 148, at 466–67 (citing International Center for 
Peace in the Middle East, Human Rights in the Occupied Territories 1979-
1983 (study conducted by the International Center for Peace in the Middle 
East) (Tel Aviv, 1985)).  To be sure, many other situations of prolonged occu-
pation, which Roberts tentatively defines as “an occupation that lasts more 
than five years and extends into a period when hostilities are sharply reduced, 
i.e., a period approximating peacetime,” have taken place throughout history.  
See generally Roberts, supra note 66, at 29–32 (enumerating and describing 
situations of prolonged occupation, most notably the Allied occupation of 
Germany and Japan after World War II and the South African occupation of 
Namibia after the termination by the United Nations of its international 
mandate in 1966).  However, very few if any of the previous “prolonged mili-
tary occupations” have approximated the length, and more importantly, the 
extensiveness, i.e., settlement activity, quasi-independent governmental ad-
ministrative structures, that is exemplified by the Israeli occupation of Pales-
tinian territories, especially the West Bank, which is often viewed as territory 
under de facto annexation by Israel.  See RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER’S LAW: 
ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 11 (1985) (“While the [West Bank] as a whole is 
not in theory annexed to Israel the settlements are subject to de facto annexa-
tion and apply Israeli law and are served by the Israeli infrastructure and 
administrative structure.”).  With the harsh conditions confronting the Pales-
tinian residents of the occupied territories, those who are not able to tolerate 
such conditions will eventually be forced to move thus allowing Israel to ac-
complish its eventual goal of annexing the occupied territories.  Id.  Indeed, 
the United States has already given the green-light to an eventual annexation 
of portions of the Occupied Territories by Israel: 
In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing ma-
jor Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the out-
come of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to 
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First, Israel has occupied the West Bank and Gaza for over 
thirty-five years which cannot be described as a temporary 
situation.157  Second, while the occupation still involves use of 
force by both the occupying state and the occupied state, it can-
not be said that the force perpetrated has consistently reached 
the scale of an armed conflict throughout the thirty-six years of 
the occupation.158  Thirdly, the prospects for political compro-
mise from Israel or Palestine are bleak if not non-existent.159  
Therefore, the protections offered by humanitarian law are in-
sufficient and not contemplated to protect the fundamental 
rights of individuals in all aspects of life; an imperative in any 
long-term governance by one state over another.160     
The case for applying human rights law to the Occupied Ter-
ritories is even stronger when reference is made to views of the 
  
the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-
state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to ex-
pect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the ba-
sis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.  
The White House, President Bush Commends Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s 
Plan (Apr. 14, 2004) (letter from President Bush to Prime Minister Sharon), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-3. 
html. 
 157. See Dugard, supra note 148, at 466 (“There is undoubtedly much valid-
ity in the argument that belligerent occupancy is intended as a temporary, 
provisional measure and not one that continues for over twenty years.”); Rob-
erts, supra note 66, at 42 (“For the most part, the Israeli occupation of territo-
ries since 1967 does belie the assumption that occupation is temporary”). 
 158. See Dugard, supra note 148, at 467. 
 159. See Roberts, supra note 66, at 43 (analyzing the substantial political 
obstacles involved in reaching a potential peace agreement between Israel and 
Palestine). 
 160. See Dugard, supra note 148, at 467.  The inadequacy of the protections 
offered by humanitarian law in a regime of prolonged occupation is also as-
serted by one commentator as a possible basis for the application of human 
rights law: 
While the [Geneva Conventions] remain[s] applicable to a large ex-
tent during the prolonged occupation phase, it is insufficient to en-
sure adequate protection for the needs of the civilian population dur-
ing that phase.  Further protection is called for.  It is submitted that 
the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants on Hu-
man Rights may be used to guide the belligerent occupant in the ad-
ministration of the territory occupied, just as civilian governments 
may be guided by these laws in the administration of their own terri-
tories.   
COHEN, supra note 151, at 29.   
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various Committees established by the human rights conven-
tions to which Israel is a State party.  In particular, the Human 
Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination established by the ICCPR161 and the 
CERD162 respectively to monitor and enforce compliance with 
the conventions have recognized the applicability of human 
rights law to the occupied territories.163   
  
 161. ICCPR art. 28, supra note 143, at 179.   
 162. CERD art. 8, supra note 144, at 224.  
 163. In the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee with 
respect to Israel’s compliance with its legal obligations under the ICCPR is-
sued in 1998 it was emphasized that “the applicability of rules of humanitar-
ian law does not by itself impede the application of the [ICCPR]” and its appli-
cation must be extended to “the occupied territories and those areas … where 
Israel exercises effective control.” Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 63d 
Sess., 1694th mtg., at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (July 28, 1998), 
available at http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF?OpenDatabase [hereinafter 
1998 ICCPR Concluding Observations].  The Committee reaffirmed its posi-
tion with regard to the applicability of the ICCPR to the Israeli occupied terri-
tories in 2003: 
The Committee reiterates the view…that the applicability of the re-
gime of international humanitarian law during an armed conflict 
does not preclude the application of the [ICCPR]…Nor does the appli-
cability of the regime of international humanitarian law preclude ac-
countability of States parties…for the actions of their authorities out-
side their own territories, including in occupied territories.  The 
Committee therefore reiterates that, in the current circumstances, 
the provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of the population 
of the Occupied Territories, for all conduct by the State party’s au-
thorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment of 
rights enshrined in the [ICCPR] and fall within the ambit of State re-
sponsibility of Israel under the principles of public international law.” 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 78th Sess., 2128th – 2130th mtgs., at ¶ 11, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/ 
doc.nsf.   
  The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has 
adopted a similar view of whether human rights law should apply to the Is-
raeli-occupied territories.  In its Concluding Observations issued in 1998, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination stated, under the 
heading of “The Occupied Palestinian Territories,” that “Israel is accountable 
for implementation of the [CERD] … in all areas over which it exercises effec-
tive control.” Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 9 of the Convention, U.N. CERD, 52d Sess., 1272d mtg., ¶12, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/304/Add.45 (1998), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf; see 
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As a related yet distinct matter is the effect of an official dec-
laration of a state of emergency upon the declaring state’s hu-
man rights obligations.  Israel has, since May 19, 1948, four 
days after it was established, been in an official state of emer-
gency.164  The original declaration of emergency was based pri-
marily on the war then existing between Israel and its 
neighboring states in addition to the continuing insurgencies of 
the Jewish and Arab populations.165  However, the official state 
of emergency still remains in effect for reasons of, as expressed 
by the Israeli government, “the ongoing conflict between Israel 
and its neighbors, and the attendant attacks on the lives and 
property of its citizens.”166  Indeed, upon ratifying the ICCPR on 
October 3, 1991, Israel submitted a notice of derogation stem-
ming from its state of emergency.167   
  
also Concluding Observations/Comments, Prevention of Racial Discrimination 
Including Early Warning and Urgent Procedures, U.N. CERD, 45th Sess., 
1067th mtg., paras. 83, 86, U.N. Doc. CERD/A/48/18 (1994) (advancing a simi-
lar “position of principle that, since Israel is a party to the [CERD], the Com-
mittee is competent to examine the manner in which Israel is fulfilling its 
obligations under the [CERD] with respect to everyone falling under the juris-
diction of Israel including all persons living in the territories occupied by Is-
rael.”  In a more general statement the Committee emphasized Israel’s obliga-
tion “to protect fully the life and security of the Palestinian civilians in the 
occupied territories.”), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. 
 164. See Initial Report of States Parties due in 1993 Addendum submitted 
by Israel, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 63d Sess., ¶106, at 31, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/81/Add.13 (1998), available at http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF? 
OpenDatabase [hereinafter 1998 Israel ICCPR Report].  The Government’s 
authority to declare a state of emergency is based upon Basic Law: Govern-
ment § 38, (2003) (replacing Law and Administration Ordinance § 9(a)-(d), 
5708-1948, 1 L.S.I. 7, 8–9 (1948)).  While the Government, particularly 
through its ministers, is granted substantial authority in promulgating emer-
gency regulations, such measures must not infringe upon “human dignity.” 
See Maoz, supra note 24, at 23–24.  See also Basic Law: Government § 39(d) 
(“Emergency regulations may not…allow infringement upon human dignity.”).     
 165. See 1998 Israel ICCPR Report, supra note 164, para. 106, at 31.   
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  It is instructive for one to read the full text of Israel’s notice of 
derogation under the ICCPR as it provides the reader with an analogue of the 
often-advanced “security justification” for Israel’s conduct: 
Since its establishment, the State of Israel has been the victim of con-
tinuous threats and attacks on its very existence as well as on the life 
and property of its citizens. 
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Numerous human rights conventions allow for the derogation 
from certain legal duties in times of “public emergency.”168  For 
purposes of the ensuing discussion a “public emergency” may be 
defined as a state of affairs “which threatens the life of the na-
tion.”169  A state derogating from its human rights obligations 
must adhere to several requirements.  First, it must only take 
measures “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.” 
Second, such measures taken by the State may not violate its 
other obligations under international law.  And third, the dero-
gation cannot be discriminatory.170  Furthermore, a declaration 
of an emergency under human rights law must be temporary.171 
  
These have taken the form of threats of war, of actual armed attacks, 
and campaigns of terrorism resulting in the murder of and injury to 
human beings.  In view of the above, the State of Emergency which 
was proclaimed in May 1948 has remained in force ever since.  This 
situation constitutes a public emergency within the meaning of arti-
cle 4(1) of the [ICCPR].  The Government of Israel has therefore 
found it necessary, in accordance with the said article 4, to take 
measures to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation, for the defence of the State and for the protection of life and 
property, including the exercises of powers of arrest and detention. 
Insofar as any of these measures are inconsistent with article 9 of the 
[ICCPR], Israel thereby derogates from its obligations under that 
provision.  
Id.  
 168. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1978, art. 
27, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 152 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter 
American Human Rights Convention]; ICCPR art. 4, supra note 143, at 174; 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 9, supra note 101, 
at 140; European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 232, 234 (entered 
into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Human Rights Convention]; 
Declaration art. 29(2), supra note 137.  
 169. ICCPR art. 4(1), supra note 143, at 174.  This definition is in accord 
with those existing in other human rights conventions and opinions of inter-
national tribunals.  See John Quigley, The Right to Form Trade Unions under 
Military Occupation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note 37, at 295, 310–12 [hereinafter Quigley, 
Trade Unions]. 
 170. The derogation provision of the ICCPR provides: 
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and 
the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to 
the present Covenant may take measure derogating from their obli-
gations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
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Bearing the above requirements in mind, Israel would be un-
able to rely upon its officially proclaimed de facto emergency 
situation to justify non-adherence to its human rights obliga-
tions. While Israel, including the Occupied Territories, has been 
the site of continuing conflict, it is hard to concede that the 
same areas have been under a public emergency situation in 
which the life of the State has been threatened for almost half a 
century.  Of course, taking into account the Arab-Israeli War of 
1948 following the establishment of the State of Israel,172 the 
Arab-Israeli War of 1967 resulting in the Israeli occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza,173 the peak periods of the 1987 and 
2000 intifada,174 and other instances of armed conflict within 
Israel, a state of public emergency may have existed for twenty 
to thirty years.  However, this would still leave another twenty 
to thirty years unaccounted for in which a state of “public emer-
gency” could not have existed under the strict standards man-
dated by international authorities.175  Furthermore, by officially 
pronouncing a state of “public emergency” for the past fifty-five 
years, Israel has violated the requirement in human rights law 
that an emergency be temporary.176     
Derogation provisions require that all restrictive measures 
taken by a State be limited “to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation….”177  It follows that even if the 
situation in Israel rises to the level of a “public emergency” the 
  
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and 
do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour sex, 
language, religion, or social origin. 
ICCPR art. 4(1), supra note 143, at 174.  The CERD does not have any deroga-
tion provision which may indicate the universal rejection of any state-
sanctioned racial discrimination even in times of national emergency.  See 
generally CERD, supra note 144. See also COHEN, supra note 151, at 3 (“If a 
government did succeed in establishing the existence of [an] emergency, it 
would remain bound … by its obligation not to discriminate on grounds of 
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.”). 
 171. See Quigley, Right of Return, supra  note 35, at 204. 
 172. Emma Playfair, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINI-
STRATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note 47, at 1, 4.   
 173. Id. at 4–5.   
 174. WENDY PEARLMAN, OCCUPIED VOICES 37–40, 59–62 (2003).   
 175. See Quigley, Trade Unions, supra note 169, at 312.  
 176. See Quigley, Right of Return, supra  note 35, at 204. 
 177. ICCPR art. 4(1), supra note 143, at 174.  See also sources cited supra 
note 168.   
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restrictive measures adopted during such periods must be lim-
ited in “scope and territorial application,” proportional to the 
seriousness of the “public emergency.”178   
As demonstrated above, Israel has not been in a de facto state 
of “public emergency” for the entire fifty-five years of its exis-
tence.  Therefore, any action taken by Israel which may contra-
vene its obligations under human rights law must be struck 
down as illegal since no derogation is possible in a non-
emergency situation. 
2.   Articles 12 and 16 of the Declaration: The Protection of the 
Family as the Fundamental Unit of Society 
The family179 is recognized in the Declaration and the ICCPR 
as “the natural and fundamental group unit of society … enti-
tled to protection by society and the State.”180  As such, States 
  
 178. See 1998 ICCPR Concluding Observations, supra note 163, at para. 11.   
 179. The U.N. Human Rights Committee, states that it is “not possible to 
give the concept [of family] a standard definition” under Article 23 of the 
ICCPR, which often differs “from State to State, and even from region to re-
gion within a State.” See Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage and 
Equality of the Spouses (Art. 23): CCPR General Comment 19, U.N. Hum. 
Rts. Comm., 39th Sess., para. 2 at 29, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3 (Jul. 27, 
1990) [hereinafter ICCPR General Comment 19], available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf.  However, a family should, at a minimum, 
consist of “spouses and minor children.” ZILBERSHATS, supra note 92, at 46; 
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 488 (2d College ed. 1982) (defining “fam-
ily” as a “fundamental social group in society consisting [especially] of a man 
and woman and their offspring.”).  Israel has acknowledged the difficulty in 
defining “family” due to the “significant demographic changes in the structure 
of families in Israel.  1998 Israel ICCPR Report, supra note 164, para. 694, at 
219.  However, the liberal interpretation by Israel of the types of relation-
ships, including single-parents, non-marital cohabitants, and homosexual 
couples, which may fall under the rubric of family in terms of entitlement to 
benefits and recognition by Israeli law, is at least an implicit concession that 
the traditional structure of spouses and their minor children be included 
within the definition of “family.”  See id.  para. 694–97, at 219–21.  Moreover, 
the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, in one of its exceptions, defines a 
“member of family” as consisting of a “spouse, parent, [and] child.”  Citizen-
ship and Entry into Israel Law, § 3(2), 5763-2003.     
 180. Declaration, art. 16(3), supra note 137; ICCPR art. 23(1), supra note 
143, at 179. This principle is contained in other international and regional 
human rights conventions. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 18(1), 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 249 (entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Human Rights Charter]; American Human 
Rights Convention art. 17(1), supra note 168, at 150; International Covenant 
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are required to maintain and facilitate the creation of the fam-
ily which includes the negative obligation of protecting against 
the unlawful and arbitrary interference with the family181 as 
well as the positive obligation of ensuring persons within the 
State the right to marry and found a family.182  These rights are 
to be guaranteed to all individuals without distinction as to 
race, colour, religion, national origin, birth, or other such 
status.183   
The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law creates substan-
tial limitations on the right of Palestinians to marry Israeli na-
tionals and vice-versa.184  Section 2 of the Citizenship and Entry 
into Israel Law prohibits Palestinian spouses of Israeli citizens 
from obtaining Israeli citizenship or from acquiring an Israeli 
  
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 10(1), 993 
U.N.T.S. 3, 7 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).  In its Initial ICCPR Report, 
Israel recognized that “the family is firmly acknowledged, under both religious 
and civil law, as the basic, natural group unit in Israeli society….”  1998 Is-
rael ICCPR Report, supra note 164, ¶ 694, at 219.    
 181. See, e.g., ICCPR art. 17(1), supra note 143, at 177 (“No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his … family….”); Decla-
ration art. 12, supra note 137 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interfer-
ence with his … family….  Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.”).  Similar provisions are provided in 
other international and regional conventions.  See, e.g., American Human 
Rights Conventions art. 10(2), supra note 168, at 148; European Human 
Rights Convention art. 8(1), supra note 168, at 230.   
 182. See, e.g., CERD art. 5(d)(iv), supra note 144, at 220 (States Parties 
undertake to … guarantee the right … without distinction as to race, colour, 
or national or ethnic origin … to marriage and choice of spouse.”); ICCPR art. 
23(2), supra note 143, at 179 (“The right of men and women of marriageable 
age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.”); Declaration art. 
16(1) supra note 137 (“Men and women of full age, without any limitation due 
to race nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.  
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage, and at its 
dissolution.”).  Similar provisions exist in other international and regional 
human rights conventions.  See, e.g., African Human Rights Charter art. 
18(1)-(2), supra note 146, at 249; American Human Rights Convention art. 
17(2), supra note 168, at 150; International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights art. 10(1), supra note 156, at 7; European Human Rights 
Convention art. 12, supra note 168, at 232.  
 183. See CERD art. 5(d)(iv), supra note 144, at 220; ICCPR art. 2(1), supra 
note 143, at 173. 
 184. See generally Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, 5763-2003. See 
also text accompanying supra notes 74–79. 
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residence permit185 — both of which were previously available to 
Palestinians as a means of facilitating their marriages with Is-
raeli citizens.186  In order to appreciate the restrictive nature of 
the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, one must consider 
the practical effects emanating from the implementation of the 
Law. First, for Palestinian spouses of Israeli nationals planning 
to apply for citizenship or residency in Israel, their applications 
will no longer be considered, barring access to the only legal 
means of entry into Israel.187  Second, for Palestinian spouses of 
Israeli citizens who have already begun the application process, 
their statuses will be undetermined as long as the new Citizen-
ship Law is in effect.188  Third, for Palestinian spouses currently 
residing in Israel on a residence permit (many of whom are also 
in the process of applying for Israeli citizenship), the new law 
  
 185. Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law § 2, 5763-2003.  For the full text 
of section 2 of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law see supra text ac-
companying note 60. 
 186. See Entry into Israel Law, §§ 1-6, 5712-1952, 6 L.S.I. 159 (1951-52), 
reprinted in GREENFIELD, supra note 11, at 11 (granting of Israeli residence 
permits); Nationality Law § 7, 5712-1952, 6 L.S.I., at 52 (providing that “the 
spouse of a person who is an Israel national … may obtain Israel nationality 
by naturalization even if she or he is a minor or does not meet the [criteria 
otherwise required for obtaining Israel nationality by naturalization]”).   
 187. See Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law § 2, 5763-2003.  The story of 
Zuhdi Samada represents such a predicament: 
Zuhdi Samada is not certain when his wife, Siam, and their six-week-
old daughter will be back living with him in their home in [Israel].  
For now they are with Siam’s family in the West Bank….  Mr. 
Samada, an Israeli-Arab, says his wife and child went for a three-
week visit.  But he is not sure how Siam, who does not have a permit 
to live in Israel, will get through the West Bank army roadblock she 
will have to traverse on her way back to [Israel].  Even if she suc-
ceeds, and returns to her husband, she will be breaking the law.  If 
she is not willing to do that, then Siam and Zuhdi have two other al-
ternatives – separate or live abroad.  
Hirschberg, supra note 63.  
 188. An example of such a situation is detailed in Brief for Petitioner paras. 
15–22, at 8-9, Adalah v. Minister of Interior, High Court of Justice (H.C. 
7052/03), in which one of the petitioners, a Palestinian woman, married an 
Israeli citizen, and applied for “a status in Israel.”  Id. at 8, para. 19.  The 
petitioner’s application was rejected as mandated by Government Decision 
1813.  Id.  In a separate attempt in July 2003 to renew her residence permit, 
the Government stated in its rejection letter that the request could not be 
considered “until approval of family unification by the Ministry of Interior was 
obtained.”  Id. at 8, para. 20.   
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prevents them from renewing their residence permits, thus re-
quiring them to leave Israel.189  As a result, the family will have 
to relocate outside Israel or abandon the prospect of living to-
gether.  
These prohibitions, directed specifically at the inhabitants of 
the Occupied Territories (West Bank and Gaza excluding Israeli 
settlements),190 have effectively denied Israelis and Palestinians 
the right to marry and found a family in contravention with 
article 23(2) of the ICCPR.191  Moreover, the restrictions imposed 
by the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law also violate article 
17 of the ICCPR, which protects the family from arbitrary and 
unlawful interference.192   
  
 189. See Entry into Israel Law §§ 13, 13A(b), 5712-1952, reprinted in 
GREENFIELD, supra note 11, at 13 (providing for the conditions under which 
persons without a valid residence permit may be deported and expelled from 
Israel).   
 190. See Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law § 1, 5763-2003.   
 191. See ICCPR art. 23, supra note 143, at 179.  Protection of the family 
under article 23 requires a State party to “adopt legislative, administrative or 
other measures” which may be implemented by the State itself or through 
other social institutions. ICCPR General Comment 19, supra note 179, at 
para. 3, at 29.  In clarifying and expanding upon the principle of the “right to 
found a family” the U.N. Human Rights Committee stated:  
The right to found a family implies, in principle, the possibility to 
procreate and live together.  When States parties [to the ICCPR] 
adopt family planning policies, they should be compatible with the 
provisions of the [ICCPR] and should, in particular, not be discrimi-
natory or compulsory.  Similarly, the possibility to live together im-
plies the adoption of appropriate measures, both at the internal level 
and as the case may be, in cooperation with other States, to ensure 
the unity or reunification of families, particularly when their mem-
bers are separated for political, economic, or similar reasons. 
Id.  
 192. Article 17 of the ICCPR provides: 
1.  No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful at-
tacks on his honour and reputation. 
2.  Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.   
ICCPR art. 17, supra note 143, at 177.  The term “family” under article 17 is 
“given a broad interpretation to include all those comprising the family as 
understood in the society of the State party concerned.” The Right to Respect 
of Privacy, Family, Home, and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and 
Reputation (Art. 17): CCPR General Comment 16, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 
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It may be argued that historically, States have had the right 
to control the entry of non-nationals into their respective terri-
tories and the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law is a prod-
uct of this wide-ranging discretion.193  Moreover, the situation 
sui generis confronting Israel, in its prolonged military occupa-
tion of the West Bank and Gaza, should provide it with even 
greater discretion in matters of immigration and nationality.194  
Indeed, Israel has defended its enactment of the Citizenship 
and Entry into Israel Law on such grounds.195   
It is not disputed that Israel may take decisive action to pro-
tect its national welfare, especially where the threat of violence 
is omnipresent.  Indeed, human rights conventions allow States 
to legislate according to their security needs even if it may re-
sult in the de facto violation of human rights law.196  However, 
any State action which potentially violates fundamental human 
rights on the basis of fortuitous traits such as race, ethnicity, or 
sex, must be supported by a factual foundation that provides an 
  
32d Sess., at 21, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Apr. 8, 1988) [hereinafter 
ICCPR General Comment 16], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf.  
Furthermore, an official, State-sponsored interference with family may still be 
“arbitrary or unlawful” if the interference does not comply with the “provi-
sions, aims, and objectives of the [ICCPR].”  Id.  It is notable that the duties 
imposed on a State party under article 17 also fall within the rubric of the 
protection of the family under article 23 of the ICCPR.  See ICCPR General 
Comment 19, supra note 179.   
 193. See supra Part IV.A.1 & 2. 
 194. See supra Part V.A.1. 
 195. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs advanced the following as part of its 
defense of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law: 
Inasmuch as no sovereign nation permits the entry into its territory 
of foreign nationals who may pose a danger to its security, nor to take 
up residency, so is Israel entitled to restrict its immigration policies.  
Similarly, no rule of international law obligates a state to grant legal 
status to nationals of other nations or entities when such nations or 
entities are in a state of armed conflict or war with that state and 
when there exists a genuine threat that they would pose a danger to 
the security of the state and its citizens.   
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Legislation Regarding Citizenship 
and Residence Rights for Palestinian Residents of the Territories (Aug. 10, 
2003), at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?/MFAH0nqf0. 
 196. See, e.g., ICCPR art. 4, supra note 143, at 174; European Human 
Rights Convention art. 15, supra note 168, at 232, 234.   
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objectively reasonable basis for the proposed limitations.197  To 
couch the measure as a means of furthering State security may 
strike the balance in the State’s favor, but it does not eliminate 
the need for an objectively, reasonable justification altogether.198   
  
 197. See, e.g., Beharry v. Reno, 183 F.Supp.2d 584, 604 (2002) (finding that 
the “summary deportation of [the petitioner] a long term legal alien without 
allowing him to present the reasons he should not be deported violates the 
ICCPR’s guarantee against arbitrary interference with one’s family….”), rev’d 
sub nom. on unrelated grounds, Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2003); 
Maria v. McElroy, 68 F.Supp.2d 206, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[T]he ICCPR pre-
vents a nation from separating families in a manner that, while in accordance 
with its domestic law, is nonetheless unreasonable and in conflict with the 
underlying provisions of the ICCPR.”); Yildiz v. Austria, App. No. 37295/97, 36 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 32, 561 (2002) (“[A State’s] power to deport aliens convicted of 
criminal offenses … must, in so far as [it] may interfere with [the right to 
respect for family life guaranteed under Article 8 of the  European Convention 
of Human Rights] be necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified 
by a pressing social need and, in particular proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued.”). 
 198. During World War II, the United States Supreme Court in Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), considered the constitutionality of sev-
eral laws which operated to exclude persons of Japanese ancestry from desig-
nated military areas in the United States for the “protection against espio-
nage and against sabotage.”  The petitioner in Korematsu, an American citi-
zen of Japanese heritage, was convicted of remaining in a restricted military 
area where his home was located.  Id. at 215–16.  Prior to assessing the con-
stitutionality of the law at issue, the Court stated: 
[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group are immediately suspect.  This is not to say that all such re-
strictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must subject 
them to the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public necessity may some-
times justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism 
never can.   
Id. at 216.  Noting that “[n]othing short of apprehension by the proper mili-
tary authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety can con-
stitutionally justify [the exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from a 
threatened area]” the Court upheld the law as a valid exercise of the war 
power by Congress and the Executive necessarily relying on the expertise of 
military authorities in a time of war.  Id. at 218, 223–24.  Justice Murphy, in 
his dissent, reiterated the importance of assessing governmental actions, even 
those taken in a time of war, for reasonableness: 
Individuals must not be impoverished of their constitutional rights on 
a plea of military necessity that has neither substance nor support.  
Thus, like other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional 
rights of the individual, the military claim must be subject itself to 
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Even assuming that the Citizenship and Entry into Israel 
Law is effective in enhancing Israel’s security, the factual basis 
advanced by Israel to support the sweeping nature of the law is 
insufficient.  The Ministry of Interior, in a submission to the 
Knesset Internal Affairs Committee which considered the justi-
fications for the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, reported 
that 20 out of 140,000 persons entering Israel for family reuni-
fication purposes were involved in terrorist-related activities 
(including those involved in weapons trade).199  This statistic 
represents the Government’s primary factual justification for 
the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law as a means of pro-
tecting the Israeli population from threats of terrorism.200  The 
restriction of a population of almost 1.3 million Palestinians in 
the Occupied Territories201 from applying for an Israeli residence 
permit or Israeli citizenship on the basis of twenty terrorist-
related cases involving Palestinians cannot be viewed as a 
measure reasonably commensurate to the security risk con-
fronting Israel.   
Claims that the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law is 
based on geography, and hence not discriminatory should fail, 
since there is clear evidence that the Law is racially motivated.  
  
the judicial process of having its reasonableness determined and its 
conflicts with other interests reconciled.    
[…] 
The judicial test of whether the Government, on a plea of military ne-
cessity, can validly deprive an individual of any of his constitutional 
rights is whether the deprivation is reasonably related to a public 
danger that is so ‘immediate, imminent, and impending’ as not to 
admit of delay and not to permit the intervention of ordinary consti-
tutional processes to alleviate the danger. 
Id. at 234 (citations omitted).   
 199. Brief for Petitioner paras. 61–63, at 20, Adalah v. Minister of Interior, 
High Court of Justice (H.C. 7052/03). 
 200. Throughout the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee hearings on the 
Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, the Government repeatedly failed to 
provide requested information regarding the factual background of the Law.  
See id. paras. 61–76, at 19–24.    
 201. The 1997 First Palestinian Census taken by the Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics reports a total of 1,286,947 Palestinians between ages 15 
– 64 residing in the West Bank and Gaza, which constitutes 49.5% of the en-
tire Palestinian population in Occupied Territories.  See Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics, Population by Age Groups in Years, Region, and Sex, at 
http://www.pcbs.org/inside/selcts.htm (last modified May 12, 2002).     
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On its face, the application of the law is directed at specific geo-
graphic “areas” namely the Occupied Territories of the West 
Bank and Gaza.202  To be sure, Palestinians are not the only 
residents of these “areas,” which also includes many Jewish set-
tlers.203  However, as an almost implicit admission of the law’s 
racial motivations, the definition of “areas” excludes Israeli set-
tlements, essentially restricting its application to Palestini-
ans.204  Moreover, members of the Knesset have expressly stated 
that the Law specifically targets the Palestinians who pose a 
security threat to Israel.205  The Citizenship and Entry into Is-
rael Law, thus, limits the exercise of fundamental, human 
rights based solely on distinctions of race and national origin. 
As a racially discriminatory measure, the justifications for 
the law are subject to a more searching inquiry.206  The proof 
offered in support of the law cannot sustain this heavy bur-
den.207  Therefore, Israel has breached its obligations under the 
ICCPR and CERD to guarantee the exercise of fundamental 
human rights, without distinction as to race, national origin, or 
religion.208   
  
 202. Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law § 1, 5763-2003.   
 203. According to the latest Israeli population census, there are approxi-
mately 228,000 Jewish settlers residing within the Occupied Territories. Cen-
tral Bureau of Statistics of the State of Israel, Population in Urban Localities 
and Other Geographical Divisions, (Sept. 30, 2003) (table providing population 
data by district, sub-district and area), available at http://www.cbs.gov.il/ 
population/popul_eng.htm (last modified Sept. 30, 2003).     
 204. Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law § 1, 5762-2003. 
 205. See text accompanying supra notes 81-82.   
 206. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984) (“Classifying 
persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than 
legitimate public concerns….  Such classifications are subject to the most ex-
acting scrutiny.”) (citations omitted); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) 
(“At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifi-
cations especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subject to the ‘most rigid 
scrutiny.’”) (citation omitted); Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, App Nos. 
9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. 28, 39, para. 103 (1983) (Commis-
sion Report) (“It is generally recognised that classifications based on sex are to 
be carefully scrutinised, in order to eliminate invidious disadvantages.”); Ko-
rematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 207. See text accompany supra note 199.   
 208. See CERD art. 5(d)(iv), supra note 144, at 220; ICCPR art. 2(1), supra 
note 143, at 173.    
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VI. THE FINAL RECONCILIATION: A JEWISH DEMOCRATIC STATE  
As the one-year deadline209 for the Citizenship and Entry into 
Israel Law approaches, Israel must decide whether to renew a 
law, discriminatory in nature and purpose, or whether to pre-
serve Israel’s democratic principles by amending or repealing it.  
It is apparent that Israel’s democratic foundation cannot sup-
port a measure which restricts, on a large-scale, the exercise of 
fundamental human rights based on fortuitous traits of race 
and ethnicity.   
The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law should be 
amended, affording Palestinian applicants for residency or citi-
zenship in Israel an individualized screening process.  Indeed, 
such a practice had been in place until the passage of the new 
citizenship policy210 and there is no indication that the outright 
ban on citizenship and residency in Israel has enhanced its 
overall security.211  
By prohibiting Palestinians from seeking citizenship and 
residency in Israel solely because of race and national origin the 
measure violates principles of non-discrimination enshrined in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ICCPR, and the 
CERD.  Moreover, the law prevents Palestinians from joining 
their spouses in Israel thus infringing on the right to the estab-
lishment and protection of the family.  And, without further 
justification, the racially discriminatory motive and effect of the 
law constitutes an arbitrary interference with the family.  Thus, 
Israel is in breach of its international human rights obligations. 
However, it is not only Israel’s increasingly restrictive citi-
zenship policy which is problematic.  These discriminatory, 
  
 209. Section 5 of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law provides: 
This law shall remain in force until the end of a year from the day on 
which it is published, but the Government is entitled, with the ap-
proval of the Knesset, to prolong its validity by order, from time to 
time, for a period that shall not exceed one year on each occasion.  
Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law § 5, 5763-2003.   
 210. See Brief for Petitioner para. 40, at 113–14, Adalah v. Minister of Inte-
rior, High Court of Justice (H.C. 7052/03). 
 211. Since the implementation of the “freeze” under Government Decision 
1813 in May 2002 there have been thirty-six “terrorist attacks” in Israel 
proper and Jerusalem resulting in 272 deaths and 1,300 injured.  Anti-
Defamation League, Recent Terrorist Attacks In Israel, available at 
http://www.adl.org/Israel/israel_attacks.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).   
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anti-democratic measures are inherent in Israel’s character as a 
Jewish state and will continue to propagate as long as the 
status quo is maintained.  Israel must decide whether its de-
mocratic principles are worth sacrificing to preserve its Jewish 
character, thus creating an apartheid-like State, or whether its 
Jewishness shall give way to the security of racial harmony and 
social equality.  If history may be a guide, the answer is clear.   
Albert K. Wan* 
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